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ABSTRACT: 
Modern shipping companies are reliant on the proliferation of refined technological 
advancements  such as Electric Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS), Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), Compass 
(Gyro, fluxgate, GPS and others), Computerised Automatic Steering Systems, Voyage Data 
Recorders – “Black box” (VDR), Radio Direction and Ranging or Automatic Radar Plotting 
Aid (Radar/ARPA). These technological advancements are vulnerable to cyber security threats. 
The prevalence of maritime cyber security incidents is increasing worldwide therefore it is 
imperative for the maritime industry to have legal regime in place that adequately regulates 
these cyber security threats.  
This dissertation undertakes a critical analysis of the legal framework governing maritime 
cyber security and the adequacy in combating maritime cyber threats. The first chapter will 
provide an introduction and background to maritime cyber security.  The second chapter 
focuses on the different threats and vulnerabilities to maritime cyber security. In addition to 
this reference will be made to the types of cybercrimes and their possible ramifications. The 
third chapter will analyse the International regulatory regimes in place, regional regulatory 
framework and South Africa’s domestic laws regulating maritime cyber security. In the fourth 
Chapter a determination will be made as to the existence and adequacy of the law in combating 
maritime cyber threats and crimes. A conclusion will be derived from the findings of this 
dissertation, and recommendation will be submitted 
The purpose of this study is to establish whether, (a) the existing law applies to maritime cyber 
security threats at all, and, if so, what is the extent of the existing laws applicability to maritime 
cyber security threats? (b) whether the domestic and international legal framework is adequate, 
in respect to enforcement and comprehensiveness, to address/respond to maritime cyber 
security threats? and (c) whether it is necessary to establish new regulations to address maritime 
cyber security or develop existing laws? 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Living in the 21st century, one cannot imagine a world without the modern technology that 
people and industries have at their disposal. Since the 1970s, which was canvassed by the 
arrival of microprocessors and the introduction of Personal Computers (PC),1 technological 
advancements have provided businesses with numerous benefits including, but not limited to, 
increased efficiency to those processes that are at the core of the business and deliver value; 
improved information sharing between trading partners and enhanced communications 
between administrative personnel, manning organisations and vessel employees2 in the 
maritime industry. Garcia-Perez comments that connected ships, which are vessels that use 
remote monitoring technology to connect the vessel to the management offices,3 are 
manufactured with hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs)4 and other built-in capabilities 
that allow direct access to the internet and enable them to consume, create, supplement direct 
and share digital information.5 This information is then shared with other ships, port, oil 
platforms and semi submersibles.6  
Often, ordinary citizens, business, and even government institutions view cyber security and 
cyber-attacks as invasion of personal security and data privacy violations,7  however in reality 
cyber-attacks can have significant consequences for effects on businesses and can constitute a 
threat to national security.8 Modern shipping companies are reliant on the proliferation of 
                                                          
1 A Cosper ‘History & Evolution of Computers’ available at https://www.techwalla.com/articles/history-
evolution-of-computers , accessed on 17 April 2019. 
2 M McNicholas Maritime Security: An Introduction (2012) 367. 
3 J Zhao et al ‘A fleet technical condition management system for connected ships’ (2013) 33 The Italian 
Association of Chemical Engineering Online at 799. 
4 The ECU is the electronic engine governor with integrated engine management. The ECU offers monitoring 
and diagnostic functions for the engine. Dr. S Ihmor & C Muller ‘Monitoring and Remote Control for MTU 
Ship Propulsion Systems’ available at https://www.mtu-online.com/fileadmin/fm-dam/mtu-global/technical-
info/white-papers/3100701_MTU_General_WhitePaper_BlueVisionNG_2014.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2019.  
5 A Garcia-Perez et al ‘Towards cyber security readiness in the Maritime industry: A knowledge –based 
approached’ available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0bca/56d7f4c56899540d3ee9180ee6c8557a813b.pdf, 
accessed on 7 November 2018.  
6 Ibid 
7 J J Chung ‘Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure’ (2018) 96 Oregon Law review 441. 
8 O A Hathaway… et al ‘The law of cyber-attack’ (2012) 100(817) California Law Review at 830. 
2 
 
refined technological advancements9 such as Electric Chart Display and Information Systems 
(ECDIS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS), Compass (Gyro, fluxgate, GPS and others), Computerised Automatic Steering 
Systems, Voyage Data Recorders – “Black box” (VDR), Radio Direction and Ranging or 
Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (Radar/ARPA).10 In 2013 a team at the University of Texas at 
Austin demonstrated how a potential treat-agent could remotely take control of a vessel by 
manipulating the ship’s GPS. 11 A yacht named “White Rose of Drax” was successfully 
“spoofed” while sailing on the Mediterranean, when the research team successfully sent false 
civil GPS signals to the vessel and slowly overpowered authentic GPS signals. This resulted in 
the ship actually turning but the chart display to the crew only showed a straight line.12   
The above-mentioned vulnerabilities of maritime cyber security on board a ship, and other 
vulnerabilities in the maritime transportation system, including cargo, oil rigs and port 
operations, will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two of this dissertation.  
Other incidents of these cyber threat also exist. In 1998 Sri Lankan terrorists successfully 
attacked the servers of three embassies in the country by carrying out a denial of service attack 
on these servers.13  According to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) 14 a denial of services attack (DoS) is an attack that “occurs when legitimate users are 
unable to access information systems, devices, or other network resources due to the actions of 
a malicious cyber threat actor”.15  Though the Sri Lankan incident is generally noted as one of 
the first cyber terrorist events, one of the earliest incidents that brought the magnitude and 
seriousness of cyber security to the forefront of the world news is the Estonia cyber-attack in 
2007. Following a dispute over the relocation of a Soviet era war memorial which was 
originally called” Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn”, Estonia became the first victim of a 
                                                          
9 J DiRenzo ‘The Little –Known Challenge of Maritime Cyber Security’ available at 
http://archive.dimacs.rutgers.edu/People/Staff/froberts/MaritimeCyberCorfuPaper.final.pdf accessed on 3 June 
2019. 
10 Ibid  
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 S W Brenner & M D Goodman ‘In Defence of cyber of cyber terrorism: an argument for anticipating cyber-
attacks, 2002 Journal of law, Technology and Policy, at 30.  
14 Which is part of the United States of America’s Homeland Security is the successor entity to a variety of 
previous organisations such as the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FCIRC) and the National; 
Infrastructure Protection Center. This information security organisation has responsibility for publishing timely 
security information such as advisories, technical bulletins and vulnerabilities notes in addition to more general 
awareness and educational materials. 
15 ‘Understanding denial of service attacks’ United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 
available at https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 , accessed on 12 November 2018. 
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coordinated attack against a nation state. 16 Online servers of Estonia’s banks, government 
bodies and media outlets were hacked at unprecedented levels. For two nights Tallinn erupted 
in riots and looting which left 156 people injured, 1000 people detained and one person dead.17  
While both the above-mentioned examples illustrated the effects of cyber threats to national 
security, cyber threats are great cause for concern for corporate information security conduct 
and the international trading industry as a whole. In 2014 Sony Music lost massive amounts of 
sensitive company data when their systems where hacked. 
According to Elkind, “on November 24 2014 a crushing cyber-attack was launched on 
Sony Pictures. Employees logging on to its network were met with the sound of gunfire, 
scrolling threats and the menacing images of a fiery skeleton looming over the tiny 
‘zomibified’ heads of the studio’s top two executives... It erased everything stored on 
the 3262 of the company’s 6797 personal computers and 837 of its 1555 servers, 
making sure nothing could be recovered, the attackers added a special deleting 
algorithm that overwrote the data seven different ways, rendering the computers brain 
dead”.18 
According to Fortune Magazine “the hack terrified corporate America and devastated the 
company”. 19 The above mentioned examples solidify the argument that cyber security should 
not be viewed strictly as a violation of personal security and data privacy violations, but rather 
that threats to cyber security are both a business law concern as well as a national security 
concern. The maritime industry should view cybersecurity as such.  
The shipping industry has also suffered cyberattacks. In 2017 the NotPetya malware20 infected 
computer network systems in companies as diverse as shipping companies to global law firms, 
with damage caused being estimated at $10 billion.21   According to Reuters Shipping giant 
                                                          
16 ‘Who was behind the behind the Estonia cyber-attack?’ Foreign Policy available at 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/07/who-was-behind-the-estonia-cyber-attacks/ accessed on 5 November 
2018.  
17 ‘How a cyber-attack transformed Estonia’ BBC New online, 27 April 2017 available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415, accessed on 5 November 2018. 
18 P Elkind  ‘Inside the hack of the century’ (1 July 2015) Fortune available at http://fortune.com/sony-hack-
part-1/ accessed on 7 November 2018.  
19 T McCormack ‘The Sony and OPM double whammy: International law and cyber attacks’ (2015) 18 SMU 
Science and Technology Law Review at 379. 
20 The Merriam Webster online Dictionary defines malware as ‘software designed to interfere with a computers 
normal functioning’, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malware   ,accessed on 13 May 
2019.  
21 A M Matwyshyn ‘Cyber Harder’ (2018) 24 B.U.J SCI & Tech. L. at 451. 
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A.P Moller – Maersk, which handles more than 15 per cent of global shipping22 was affected 
by the NotPetya ransomware virus. This adapted version of the Petya virus was markedly more 
devastating in that companies could not recover their stolen data even if they paid the ransom.23 
The cyber-attack, which caused outages at its computer systems across the world in June 2017 
mimicked previous malware attacks which sought financial gain, was later identified to be 
likely written by a nation state, which sort to cause destabilisation of another country.24 The 
attack came as computer servers across Europe and India were hit by a major ransomware 
attack, which resulted in a breakdown that affected all business units at Maersk, including 
container shipping, port and tug boat operations, oil and gas production, drilling servers and 
oil tankers.25 Dutch broadcaster RTV Rijnmond reported that “Maersk’s port operator APM 
Terminals were also hit. The 17 shipping container terminals run by APM Terminals had been 
hacked, including two in Rotterdam and 15 in other parts of the world”.26  
The NotPetya malware was propelled by hackers exploiting vulnerabilities in established 
digital tools. A vulnerability in cyber security is defined as “an occurrence of a weakness (or 
multiple weaknesses) within software, in which the weakness can be used by a party to cause 
the software to modify or access unintended data, interrupt proper execution, or perform 
incorrect actions that were not specifically granted to the party who uses the weakness”.27 The 
first vulnerability to be exploited was through the penetration of the EternalBlue tool. 
EternalBlue was created by the United States National Security Agency (NSA)28 to exploit a 
vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1.29 However, earlier in 2017 there was a leak of the Agency’s 
files to the public, by the hacking group The Shadow Brokers,30 which allowed hackers to gain 
access to the EternalBlue tool. “EternalBlue takes advantage of this particular vulnerability in 
                                                          
22 M Mehlman’ How CFOs can mitigate the risk of ransomware’ (2018) available at 
https://taxexecutive.org/how-cfos-can-mitigate-the-risk-of-ransomware/ accessed on 23 February 2019. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Matwyshyn (n 21 above) at 451. 
25 ‘Maersk says global IT breakdown caused by cyber-attack’ Reuters online, 27 June 2018 available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-maersk/maersk-says-global-it-breakdown-caused-by-cyber-
attack-idUSKBN19I1NO , accessed on 5 November 2018.  
26 Ibid. 
27 J Watkins ‘No good deed goes unpunished: The duties held by malware researchers, penetration testers and 
“white hat” hackers’ (2018) 19(2) Minn J.L.SCI.& Tech at 535. 
28 A Greenberg ‘The untold story of NotPetya, the most devastating cyberattack in history’ WIRED 22 August 
2018 available at https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/  
accessed on 13 May 2019. 
29 A Server Message Block (SMB) is the file protocol most commonly used by Windows. SMB Signing is a 
feature through which communications using SMB can digitally signed at the packet level. Digitally signing the 
packets enables the recipient of the packets to confirm their point of origination and their authenticity. 
30 A Moshirnia ‘Not security through obscurity: changing circumvention law to protect our democracy against 
cyber attacks’ (2018) 83 (4) Brooklyn Law Review at 1294. 
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machines that have not patched or fixed this vulnerability”,31 which then permits hackers to 
remotely run their own code on those machines.32  
Secondly hackers used an older software called Mimikatz.  
“Mimikatz is an open-source utility that enables the viewing of credential information 
from the Windows LSASS(Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) through its 
sekurlsa module”.33 
Mimikatz could hack into machines by drawing passwords out of the RAM and use them to 
hack into other machines accessible with the same credentials.34 On networks with multiuser 
computers, Mimikatz allows the hacker to access information back and forth between the 
networks.35 
The combination of the EternalBlue tool and the Mimikatz, was vastly disastrous, because even 
though Windows had released a patch to fix the vulnerability to its system many groups had 
failed to either install the patch properly or had just not installed the patch.36 The use of 
Mimikatz meant that hackers could hack computers that were not patched for the Eternal Blue 
vulnerability and use those computers to gain access to the password of other computers in the 
company.37 The above cyber security attack, which forms the basis of this dissertation, 
illustrates that maritime cyber security threats are real and present a great cause of concern for 
the maritime sector.  
 
1.2. Definitions  
Definitions play an important role in any legal framework. It is therefore important to 
distinguish what functions those definitions have. In law, there are descriptive and statutory 
                                                          
31 Watkins (n 27 above) at 537. 
32 Greenberg (n 28 above). 
33 B Cannols & A Ghafarian ‘Hacking experiment by using USB rubber ducky scripting’ Systemics, Cybernetics 
And Informatics (2017) 15 (2) at 68, available at http://www.iiisci.org/journal/CV$/sci/pdfs/ZA340MX17.pdf , 
accessed on 12 February 2019. 
34 Greenberg (n 28 above). 
35 Ibid.  
36 N Perlroth…et al ‘Cyberattack hits Ukraine and then spreads internationally’ The New York Times Online 27 
June 2017 at 2 , available at http://www.vis-
am.ch/uploads/allegati/Cyberattack_Hits_Ukraine_Then_Spreads_Internationally_-_The_New_York_Times.pdf 
,accessed on 15 February 2019. 
37 Greenberg (n 28 above) 
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definitions.38 Descriptive definition are “used to explain the meaning of ambiguous words”39 
whereas statutory definitions “commit those that are subject to law to a particular definition of 
a word.40   
Cyber space has been defined as “the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructure. It includes the internet, telecommunications networks, and computer processing 
systems and embedded industrial processors and controllers”.41 These cyber networks are 
characterised by physical infrastructure as well as an electromagnetic spectrum that stores and 
transmits information and data.42 Protecting cyber networks against penetration by either 
malicious or innocuous actors requires maintaining the integrity, confidentiality and 
availability of information as well as effective deterrence mechanisms and efficient incident 
responses.43  
The term cyber attack can be defined as “any type of offensive manoeuvre that targets 
Information technology (IT)44 and Operational Technology (OT)45 systems, computer 
networks, and/or personal computer devices attempting to compromise, destroy or access 
company and ship systems and data”,46 Cyber attacks in this body of work refers to “an attempt 
to gain illegal access to a computer or computer system for the purpose of causing damage or 
harm.”47   The definition of maritime cyber security often centre on a particular actor or a 
certain system instead of a more holistic approach. These definitions are problematic as they 
do not give a holistic approach to the term. A broad definition of maritime cyber security is 
understood as: “the protection of electronic systems, communication networks, control 
                                                          
38 Dr. M Gercke ‘Understanding cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal response’ The ITU Publication, 
available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf , accessed 
on 28 May 2019 at 169. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 S Tully ‘Protecting Australian cyberspace: Are our international lawyers ready?’  (2012) 19 Australian 
International Law Journal 50. 
42 N Shactman ’26 Years after Gibson , Pentagon defines ‘cyberspace’ WIRED available at 
https://www.wired.com/2008/05/pentagon-define/ accessed on 22 May 2019. 
43 Tully (n 41 above) at 5.1 
44 Information technology is “the application of computers to process, transmit and store data, typically in a 
business or enterprise environment.” Available at https://ics.sans.org/media/IT-OT-Convergence-NexDefense-
Whitepaper.pdf, accessed on 30 May 2018. 
45 Operational Technology is “hardware and software systems that monitor and control physical equipment and 
processes, often found in industries that manage critical infrastructure.” Available at 
https://ics.sans.org/media/IT-OT-Convergence-NexDefense-Whitepaper.pdf , accessed on 30 May 2018. 
46 Guidelines on Cyber Security on Board Ships, published by BIMCO (Version 1.1- February 2016). 
47 ‘Cyber-attack’ Merriam Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cyberattack,  
accessed on 11 November 2018. 
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algorithms, software48, users and underlying data within the maritime infrastructure from 
malicious attacks, damage unauthorised access, or manipulation”.49 Another more 
comprehensive definition, put forward by Maskun, defines cyber security as: 
1. “A set of activities and other measures intended to protect - from attacks, disruption 
or other threats - computers, computer networks, related hardware and devices 
software, and the information they contain and communicate, including software 
data, as well as the other elements of cyberspace. The activities can include security 
audit, patch management, authentication procedures, access management, and so 
forth. They can involve for example, examining and evaluating the strength of 
vulnerabilities of the hardware and software used in the country’s political and 
economic electronic infrastructure. They also involve detection and reaction to 
security events, mitigation of impacts and recovery of affected components. Other 
measures can include thing like software and hardware firewalls, physical security 
such as hardening facilities and personnel training and responsibilities;”50 
2. “The state or quality of being protected from such threats”;51 
3. “The broad field of endeavour, including research and analysis, aimed at 
implementing and improving those activities and quality.” 52 
Cyber security on board a ship protects “the operational technology against the unintended 
consequences of a cyber-incident; information and communications systems and the 
information contained therein from damage, unauthorised use or modification, or exploitation; 
and/or against interception of information when communicating and using the internet”.53 
A “cyber incident” is “an occurrence, which actually or potentially results in adverse 
consequences to an on-board system, network and computer or the information that they 
process, store or transmit, and which may require a response action to mitigate the 
consequences”.54 
                                                          
48 The Merriam Webster online Dictionary defines software as “the entire set of programs, procedures, and 
related documentation associated with a mechanical or electronic system and especially a computer system” 
available at  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/software, accessed on 13 May 2019. 
49 Garcia-Perez (n 5 above). 
50 Maskun, ‘Cyber security: rule of use internet safely’ (2013) 15 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization at 
20. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 The BIMCO guidelines (n 46 above).  
54 Ibid.  
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It should be noted that definitions at to what cyber security threats and attacks are, are not 
universally agreed upon which makes regulations of these types of attacks increasingly 
difficult. 
1.3. Research Problem 
The prevalence of maritime cyber security incidents is increasing worldwide. Reports suggest 
that cybercrime amounts to more than $400 billion in annual costs to the global economy.55  
According to the Cisco Annual Security Report South Africa is one of the most targeted 
counties for cyber-crime, this is due in part to outdated organisational structures and practices. 
It has been reported that “South Africa lost approximately ZAR50 billion in 2014 due to cyber 
–incidents, and that over half a billion online personal records were lost or accessed illegally 
in South Africa during 2015”,56 with these number expected to rise in the coming years.  With 
the launch of the Smart Port Initiative, the port of Durban has an Integrated Port Management 
System,  
which is a holistic, web-based, end-to-end system that integrates Marine Operations, 
Systems and Reporting, on a single platform. This system provides users with access to 
a wide range of near real-time operational information- that is accessed centrally 24/7.57 
With a goal of turning Durban port into a successful smart port, it will be in the government’s 
best interest to ensure a proper cyber security platform is implemented as part of the foundation 
of the port.58 In South Africa cybercrime accounts for 0.14% as a percentage of GDP.59 
There are a number of inherent complexities and challenges to maritime cyber security. First, 
there are different categories of vessels (bulk carriers, break-bulk carriers, container ships, auto 
carriers, tankers, passenger ships etc.), all of which operate on different computer systems and 
are built to last a long time. Crew members often work with systems that they are unfamiliar 
with. According to Jensen, the maritime industry has a unique set of characteristics that make 
                                                          
55 ‘Cyber-Security Threats to the Maritime Industry’ available at 
http://www.mile.org.za/QuickLinks/News/1st%20Annual%20Maritime%20Summit%20Presentations/Day%201.
6-Carl%20Uys-Cyber%20Security%20Threats.pdf , accessed on 5 November 2018. 
56 B Van Niekerk ; An analysis of cyber incidents in South Africa’ (2017) 20 The African Journal of 
Information and Communication at 114. 
57 “Port of Durban: The Busiest container port in sub-Saharan Africa’ Transnet available at 
https://www.transnetnationalportsauthority.net/OurPorts/Durban/Documents/(TNPA)%20Durban%20Brochure
.pdf , accessed on 29 April 2019 at 6. 
58 Ibid.  
59 ‘Net losses: estimating the global cost of cybercrime. economic impact of cybercrime II’ Center for Strategic 
and International Studies available at https://collabra.email/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/rp-economic-impact-
cybercrime-2014.pdf , accessed on 6 November 2018 on page 20. 
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cyber defence difficult.60 In generic shipping line operations, IT departments are often land 
based systems, whereas the IT systems on board a vessel are within the control and scope of 
the marine technical department on board that particular ship, who often have a limited 
understanding of the backend systems used or the technological infrastructure on board that 
ship.61 Chartering of ships add to this challenge as the shipping line may not have full control 
of the crew on board the ship.62  The fluctuating nature of the users of the IT systems on board 
a ship and the dynamic schedule that ships operate under often results in crew members being 
unfamiliar with the technology.63 For example many ships do not change their passwords and 
default usernames, and because of this hackers can take advantage of this and remotely 
reconfigure a ship’s Electronic Chart Display software (ECDIS),64 which would allow hackers 
to change the receiver’s GPS location, which could lead to a collision.65 
Second, differing views and approaches existing to address the challenge and threats to 
maritime cyber security.66 Currently regulators follow one of three approaches when 
considering cybersecurity. These approaches include the Technical Approach which “sees a 
problem as a technical challenge to be overcome… by developing new devices and or methods 
to respond quickly”67 to cyber challenges. The Criminal Approach which consists of “formal 
legal regimes and strong widely understood domestic and international norms for reducing 
crime”68. The Warfare Approach “seeks to develop and apply military doctrine for threat 
deterrence and response”.69  
Lastly, the different conventions contain generic terms which are vague and do not give a clear 
indication as to how vessels are to be protected from cyber threats and how to protect the lives 
of the passengers and crew on board a vessel should a cyber-attack occur while the vessel is  at 
sea. For example, in 1948 a Convention formally establishing the International Maritime 
                                                          
60 L Jensen ‘Challenges in maritime cyber-resilience’ 2015 Technology Innovation Management Review, 
available at https://timreview.ca/sites/default/files/Issue_PDF/TIMReview_April2015.pdf#page=35 , accessed 
on 28 May 2019. 
61Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 K Martin and R Hopcraft ‘Why 50,000 ships are so vulnerable to cyber attacks’ The Conversation 14 June 
2018, available at https://phys.org/news/2018-06-ships-vulnerable-cyberattacks.html , accessed on 28 May 
2019.  
64 A computer –powered navigation system. 
65 L Kelion ‘ Ships hack ‘risk chaos in English Channel’ ‘BBC News Online 7 June 2018, available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44397872 ,accessed on 19 February 2019. 
66J Healey & H Pitts ‘Applying international environmental legal norms to cyber statecraft’ (2012) 8(2) ISJLP at 
359.  
67 Ibid at 357. 
68 Ibid at 358. 
69 Ibid at 358. 
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Organisation70 was adopted in and international conference in Geneva.71 A key purpose of the 
IMO is… 
Article 1 (a)  To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting 
shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adoption of the highest 
practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and 
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships; and to deal with administrative and legal 
matters related to the purposes set out in this Article.72 
In order to improve maritime cyber security and safety, the IMO is required to develop 
International treaties and foster mechanism for co-operation among governments in the 
development of their regulatory framework, so as to realise the purpose of its function. 
Technological advancements and computing technology is changing at an exponential rate,73 
the threats to cyber security will inevitably try to keep up with these advancements, the true 
challenges to maritime security will thus be whether regulations focused on cyber security 
change at the same pace. While the IMO has accepted that it has to play a fundamental role in 
“combating the growing menace that terrorism and other unlawful acts posed for the safety of 
international shipping,”74 there has been no mention of the proposed way of combating the 
unlawful acts and in turn the enforcement strategies to be applied. 
Both domestic law and international legal regimes have fallen short of regulating maritime 
cyber security. For example the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”75 (herein 
after referred to as UNCLOS), does not explicitly provide for cyber security. This then means 
that nations that are signatories to this convention, would have to interpret other sections of the 
Convention that could apply to maritime cyber security, leaving room for misinterpretation or 
narrow approaches being followed to the detriment of one party. For example, Article 19 of 
                                                          
70 The original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO, but the name 
was changed in 1982 to IMO.Resolution A.358 (ix), Adopted on 14 November 1975 available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_358_IX-E.pdf accessed 22 May 2019. 
71 ‘Brief history on the IMO’ http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx accessed on 4 
November 2018.  
72 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, art. 1, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 
621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization Adopted 
by the United Nations Maritime Conference in Geneva on 6 March 1948. 
73 L Sturdevant, ‘Cyber warfare and maritime security: A call for international regulation’ in J DiRenzoIII… et 
al Issues in Maritime Cyber Security Washing DC: Westphalia Press, (2017) at 123. 
74 R Balkin ’The International Maritime Organisation and Maritime Security’ (2006) 30(1&2) Tulane Maritime 
Law Journal 3. 
75United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) available at 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf accessed on 20 May 2019. 
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UNCLOS deals with the safe passage of vessels and Article 109 (a) of UNCLOS which deals 
with the suppression of unauthorised broadcasting from the high seas. Both these articles are 
wide enough to encompass unauthorised digital penetration of vessels at sea as well as attacks 
by hackers to a vessel at sea. “The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code”76, further 
makes it mandatory for its signatories to take appropriate preventative measures against 
security threats. The Code falls short in that it does not set out what these steps are or even a 
minimum set of guideline to be followed. In South Africa, cyber security and maritime cyber 
security are largely unregulated. In order to prosecute a cyber-transgression one would have to 
rely on the “Electronic Communications and Transactions Act”77 or the “Regulation of 
Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act”.78 
Both of these do not have stringent prosecutorial remedies. No mention of specific 
technological requirements or capabilities or which entities are charged with reaction 
responsibilities are found in the Acts and conventions mentioned above. The Cybercrimes and 
Cyber Security Bill of 2002 sought to rectify this however the bill has not been enacted in the 
country.  These conventions and South Africa’s domestic laws will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
1.4. Research question 
The questions to be answered in this dissertation are whether:  
(i) the existing law applies to maritime cyber security threats, and, if so,  what is the 
extent of the existing laws’ applicability to maritime cyber security threats?  
(ii) the domestic and international legal framework is adequate, in respect to 
enforcement and comprehensiveness, in addressing/responding to maritime cyber 
security threats? and  
(iii) it is necessary to establish new regulations to address maritime cyber security or 
develop existing laws? 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Code International Ship and Port Security Code, Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended. 
77 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
78 Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 
of 2002. 
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1.5. Key points from existing literature: 
A M Matsyshyn, who has written extensively about cyber security and who challenges existing 
assumptions of the emerging legal area of cyber security, argues that the two main focuses of 
cybersecurity, namely information-sharing and deterrence,79 which fail to acknowledge that 
national security concerns and corporate sharing cannot be separated. This problem is called 
“reciprocal security vulnerability”.80 The issue of reciprocal security vulnerability means that 
the security threats and vulnerabilities impacting the public sector impacts the private sector 
and likewise vulnerabilities in the private sector impact the public sector, the two are 
inextricably interwoven.81 Therefore, “in practice our current legal paradigms channel us in 
suboptimal directions”.82 Matsyshyn emphasises three flaws that cause legal and policy 
dialogues on cyber security to be misframed.  First, “questions of privacy are often conflated 
with questions of security”. These questions according to Matsyshyn require different enquires. 
Legal scholars and policy makers often frame cyber security in the lens and as indistinguishably 
reliant on privacy law. Legal scholars who argue on this point, like Bambauer, put forward that 
“security merely implements privacy choices”83 and that the prevention of cyber security 
breaches is futile and should rather be replaced with mitigating the effect of cyber threats after 
the ccurrence.84 Secondly Matsyshyn argues, that technical barriers between policy makers and 
computer scientist, due to a deficiency in language, means that often the two parties 
misunderstand each other to the detriment of policy changes in a nation.85 Lastly cyber security 
is not just cyber in its nature, often physical and digital security considerations have to be 
made.86  
Foote advocates for a cyber a culture of cyber risk awareness and contends that it is “critical 
for all maritime partners to implement a culture of cyber risk awareness…that must be 
pervasive, reaching from the highest level of management to the workers at the most junior 
position”.87 Additionally governments should “work with industry to share information 
                                                          
79 A M Matsyshyn ‘CYBER’ 2010 BYU L. REV at 1109. 
80 Ibid  at 1121. 
81 Ibid  at 1109. 
82 Ibid  at 1109. 
83 D E Bambauer ‘Ghost in the Network’ (2014) 162 U. PA. L. REV.at 1012.  
84 Ibid at 1135-44. 
85 Ibid at 1146. 
86 Ibid at 1154. 
87 Foote, R ‘Cybersecurity in the marine transportation sector: Protecting intellectual property to keep our ports, 
facilities and vessels safe from cyber threats’ (2017) 8 Cybris Intell. Prop. L. Rev. at 264. 
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leverage current regulations to their full extent and create new regulations that specifically 
focus on cyber security”.88 
The deep existing problems brought by cyber security threats lie in the complex nature of 
regulating the cyber threats as jurisdiction is difficult to establish and the outcomes of the cyber 
threats are global in nature with transnational repercussions. According to Cassim, the 
challenge facing cybercrime regulation lies in the fact that cybercrimes “can be easily 
committed, it requires few resources, and it can be committed in a specific jurisdiction without 
the offenders being physically present there”.89 Cassim further provides that “domestic 
solutions are inadequate because cyberspace has no geographic or political boundaries, and 
many computer systems can be easily accessed from anywhere in the world”.90  
Sturdevant, puts forward that Academic papers such as the Tallinn Manual91 on “International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare”92 are insufficient for regulation of cyber security, mainly 
because the international community might not be adequately equipped or even prepared to 
create international treaties regulate cyber security because the use of the internet is linked to 
privacy rights or the right to freedom of speech. 93 
Stahl importantly puts forward that cyber transgressions pose an unprecedented challenge to 
cyber security, thus “without an international agreement that defines the spectrum of cyber 
aggression, provides for some form of universal jurisdiction over perpetrators and establishes 
and international organization focused on cyber security policy, the threat to international 
security posed by cyber transgressions will continue to grow”.94 
It is common cause the legal framework regulating maritime cyber security and maritime 
cybercrimes is not where it should be internationally, regionally and of importance to this body 
of work domestically.   
 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
89 F Cassim ‘Addressing the growing spectre of cybercrime in Africa: evaluating measures adopted by South 
Africa and other regional role player” available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/79170924.pdf accessed on 30 
May 2019. 
90 F Cassim ‘Formulating specialized legislation to address the growing spectre of cyber-crime: A comparative 
study’ (2009) 12(4) PER at 66. 
91 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable To Cyber Warfare, Prepared by the International Group 
of Experts at the Invitation of The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence(2009). 
92 Sturdevant (n 73 above) at 119. 
93 Ibid. 
94 W M Stahl ‘The uncharted waters of cyber space: Applying the principles of the international maritime law to 
the problem of cyber ‘(2011) 40 (247) GA. J.INT’L & COMP.L. at 273. 
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1.6. Delimitations  
It is necessary to set the parameters of this dissertation. The dissertation will not consider the 
measures and framework used by naval intelligence during times of war. The term cyber-attack 
is used here in a purely technical sense in a peace time scenario and not in the meaning of 
armed conflict. 
 
1.7. Research methodology 
This dissertation will be based on a doctrinal analysis of international and domestic legal 
principles, legislation and policies 
This dissertation will be based on a desktop/black letter review of the relevant legal materials. 
This analysis will be performed through utilising documentary sources such as media articles, 
reports, practice and policy guides, reviews, journal articles and statistical data. 
 
1.8. Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation undertakes a critical analysis of the legal framework governing maritime 
cyber security and the effectiveness in combating maritime cyber threats. Having provided an 
introduction and background to maritime cyber security in this chapter, the second chapter 
focuses on the different threats and vulnerabilities to maritime cyber security. In addition to 
this reference will be made to the types of cybercrimes and their possible ramifications. The 
third chapter will analyse the international regulatory regimes in place, regional regulatory 
framework and South Africa’s domestic laws regulating maritime cyber security. In the fourth 
Chapter a determination will be made as to the existence and adequacy of the law in combating 
maritime cyber threats and crimes. A conclusion will be derived from the findings of this 
dissertation, and recommendation will be submitted. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS TO MARITIME CYBER SECURITY 
 
2.1. Maritime cybersecurity threats:  
The increase in connectivity in the maritime industry had dramatically changed the way that 
business in the maritime industry is conducted. It is clear that it is in the best interest of the 
maritime community to develop a comprehensive and multilateral cyber security legal 
framework, as the widespread use of the internet in every aspect of daily life has created an 
almost “irreversible dependence” on technology.95 It is therefore essential to identify these 
threats. Threats in the shipping industry can vary. They can either be intentional or 
unintentional (accidental) and also “targeted at a specific company, ship or fleet or untargeted 
(shotgun approach)”.96 A number of maritime cyber security threats are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
2.1.1. Malware 
Malware, is the abbreviated form for “malicious software” and is a term that comprehensively 
covers a variety of malicious forms of computer software.97 This includes computer viruses, 
Trojan horses and worms or any type of malicious code.98 Malware often infects the computer 
to and emails or websites that have been modified to carry out functions that they were not 
originally intended for.99 Malware is intended to “steal data from a computer an exploit any 
known deficiencies and problems of the network”.100  Characterisation of software as malware 
is based on the intention of the person creating the software than the features the software 
contains.  
 
 
                                                          
95Ibid at 249. 
96 S Langouvardou ‘Maritime Cyber Security: Concepts, Problems and Models’ (Master’s Thesis, Technical 
University of Denmark, 2018). 
97 McNicholas (n 2 above) at 377. 
98 McNicholas (n 2 above) at 377. 
99 D Weissbrodt ‘Cyber Conflict, Cyber Crime and Cyber Espionage’ (2013) 22 (2) Minnesota Journal of 
International Law at 355. 
100 Langouvardou (note 96 above). 
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In 2010 cybercriminals were becoming more organised and began utilising more sophisticated 
coders and programmers to hide their malware.101 Because this gave the cybercriminals more 
time to conduct their illegal activities, the frequency and extent of these types of attacks grew 
and cybercriminals were becoming bolder in their attacks.102  
2.1.1.1. Virus 
A virus is similar to a biological virus. A virus is a “program that modifies other computer 
programs, causing them to perform the task for which the virus was intended.”103 A computer 
virus can be spread though sharing files or data via email, over the internet using company 
networks (intranet) or by disk.104 
2.1.1.2. Trojan Horse 
Trojan horses are programs that have a legitimate function, but simultaneously contain a hidden 
malicious code, which tricks a user into installing or running a seemingly harmless 
programme.105 Once this is done the perpetrator releases and activates the hidden code, which 
activates a virus or enables a person to get unauthorised access into a particular system. 106 
2.1.1.3. Logic bombs 
Logic bombs are instructions coded onto a program “which trigger a function at some later 
stage pursuant to which disruption or harm can be caused to the computer or its data.”107 
 
2.1.1.4. Worms 
A worm is a program that uses the computer networks or the internet to create copies of itself.108 
Whereas viruses need human action to replicate and spread between different computer, worms 
                                                          
101 A Minnaar ‘Organised crime and the ‘new more sophisticated ‘criminals within the cybercrime environment: 
How ‘organised ‘ are they in the traditional sense?’ (2016) 29 (2) Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal 
of Criminology at 130. 
102 Ibid. 
103 J L McCurdy ‘Computer crimes’ (2010) 47 (287) African Criminal Law Review at 291. 
104 Ibid.  
105 P J Denning ‘Computer Viruses’ (21 March 1988) Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science 
available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19890017050.pdf accessed on 29 April 2019. 
106 Ibid. 
107 D M Reimer ‘Judicial and legislative responses to computer crimes’ 1LAN986 Insurance Counsel Journal 
408. 
108 McCurdy (n 103 above) at 291.. 
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can “modify and delete files and even eject additional malware into the computer”109 on their 
own. 
2.1.2. Ransomware 
Ransomware is a type of malware where by a computer is infected or functions of a computer 
are specifically disabled with the intention of leveraging the attack on the computer, for 
payment of a ransom. 110 
2.1.3. Spyware 
Spyware is a form of malware that, once installed a computer monitors the user’s activities. 
This is usually done without the user’s knowledge.111 Spyware can gather a variety of 
information including emailing information, user names and passwords and even track every 
keystroke of the web activity of the user.112  
2.1.4. Social Engineering 
In modern day businesses including in the maritime environment, “people interact extensively 
with computer systems, whether that be the ship’s navigation system a drilling rig or a ballistic 
missile system”.113  Good information technology security is never solely based on protecting 
a company or government institution from the theft of the physical machine. Human 
vulnerability through manipulation and threat are always key aspects of cyber and information 
security.114 Social engineering is the tem used when cyber attackers exploit the fragilities of 
human behaviour to gain access to and organisation’s systems or the virtual premises of that 
organisation.115 In this way the social engineers manipulate insider individuals to become a 
conduit between the attacker (cyber attacker) and the computer system they want to attack.116 
This type of attack on maritime platforms and maritime infrastructure is normally conducted 
                                                          
109 Langouvardou (note 96 above). 
110 P R DeMuro ‘Keeping internet pirates at bay: Ransomware negotiation on the health industry (2017) 14 
Nova Law Review at 352. 
111 D B Garrie; A F Blakley; M J Armstrong ‘Legal status of Spyware’ (2006) 59 Federal Communications Law 
Journal at 160. 
112 Ibid at 161. 
113 O Fitton…et al ‘The future of maritime cyber Security’ (2015) available at 
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/72696/1/Cyber_Operations_in_the_Maritime_Environment_v2.0.pdf  , accessed on 2 
November 2018. 
114 Matsyshyn (n 79 above) at 1156. 
115 J Parms ’10 Common social engineering tactics used by attackers’ 22 February 2015 available at 
https://www.business.com/articles/10-common-social-engineering-tactics-used-by-attackers/  ,accessed on 11 
November 2018.   
116 Langouvardou (note 96 above). 
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when the attack manipulate employs and former employees, who usually have a sophisticated 
understanding of the company’s computer systems, into uploading malicious software on the 
computers. Social engineering is usually the first point of accesses in launching cyber malicious 
software on an organisation.117 Through social engineering hackers often gain access to their 
targets credentials or access to the physical machine to launch malware such as viruses or 
worms.118 Employees of companies and former employees have managed to successfully 
launch malicious software, and employ in extortionate acts on the company or steal the 
company’s trade secret among other crimes.119   
2.1.5. Phishing 
In the past decade online cyber attacks have increased in severity and regularity, partly due to 
the difficulty in identifying cybercriminals and perpetrators, making cybercrime one of the 
fastest growing crimes in the world.120 Phishing refers to “the act of sending an e-mail to a user 
falsely claiming a legitimate bank, organisation or company with the intention to coax the user 
into surrendering private information about him or her or his or her company”.121 Thus phishing 
schemes “utilise pretext emails…where the phishers pose as a trusted entity such as a financial 
institution, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or a government agency”.122 Phishing is usually 
directed at a group of people in the hopes that one or some of them will fall prey to the trap. 
Although phishing emails are widely used, they can only pose a threat if they are opened.123 
2.1.5.1. Spear phishing 
Spear phishing is a method, whereby hacker or cyber criminals target a specific user who has 
access privileges in a particular company or organisation.124 The targeted nature of spear 
phishing means that perpetrators must have prior knowledge of the target user or victim. 
                                                          
117 Ibid.  
118 L Ablon ‘Social engineering explained: The human element in cyber attacks’ 20 October 2015 available at 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/10/social-engineering-explained-the-human-element-in-cyberattacks.html, 
accessed on 11 November 2018. 
119 D W Yang and B M Hoffstadt ‘Countering the cyber-crime threat’ (2006) 43 (201) American Criminal Law 
Review 205.   
120 F Cassim ‘Addressing the spectre of phishing: Are adequate measures in place to protect victims from 
fishing’ (2014) 41 Comparative and International Journal of South Africa 406. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 I Kilovaty ‘World Wide Web of exploitations- The case of peacetime cyber espionage operations under 
international law: Towards a contextual approach’ (2016) 18 The Columbia Science and Technology Law 
Review 50. 
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2.1.6. Water holing 
The name of this type of cyber attack was inspired by the wild, whereby predators would lurk 
around the water hole waiting for unsuspecting prey. Water holing refers to an attack “in which 
the attacker seeks to compromise a specific group of end users by infecting websites that 
member of the group are known to visit”. 125 Water holing attacks are often untargeted and 
intentional. 126 Cybercriminals often infect a popular site with malware that is automatically 
loaded when an individual visit that site.127  
2.1.7. Distributed Denial of Services  
Regulating the cyber world in the legal sense is very difficult, mainly because cyber-attacks 
such as Distributed denial of service (DDOS) are carried out in a manner that makes it very 
difficult to identify the perpetrator. This makes these types of cybercrimes, extremely attractive 
for cyber criminals, as liability is difficult to prove. Denial of services refers to “an attack that 
seeks to disable the target so that it no longer is able to offer the services it normally 
provides”.128 According to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) 129 a denial of services attack (DoS) “attack occurs when legitimate users are unable to 
access information systems, devices, or other network resources due to the actions of a 
malicious cyber threat actor”.130 The server is generally “sent a large volume of 
communications traffic that overwhelms it and causes it to crash”.131 On the other hand 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) “occurs when multiple machines are operating together 
to attack one target”132 The services that may be affected include websites, online accounts, 
email or other services that rely on the server network or the computer. The attack makes use 
of many other computer that have been previously infected by malware referred to as 
                                                          
125 ‘Watering hole attack’ available at https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/watering-hole-attack, 
accessed on 11 November 2018. 
126Langouvardou (note 96 above).  
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid. 
129 Which is part of the United States of America’s Homeland Security is the successor entity to a variety of 
previous organisations such as the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FCIRC) and the National; 
Infrastructure Protection Center. This information security organisation has responsibility for publishing timely 
security information such as advisories, technical bulletins and vulnerabilities notes in addition to more general 
awareness and educational materials. 
130 ‘Understanding Denial of Service Attacks’ United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 
available at https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 , accessed on 12 November 2018. 
131 J A Chandler ‘Security in cyberspace: Combating distributed denial of services attacks’ 2003-2004 
University of Ottawa law and Technology Journal 236. 
132 US-CERT (n 130 above). 
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“zombies”.133 A distributed denial of services involves remotely instructing large networks of 
these “zombie” machines to attack a targeted site simultaneously,134 these Zombie PC networks 
are called bonnets.  Because many of these zombie PCs seek access on to a particular server at 
the same time, it becomes very difficult to distinguish malicious access by a zombie PC and a 
legitimate one.135  
2.1.8. Port Scanning 
A computer uses some of its 65 536  Transmission Control Protocol ports for internet and email 
purposes.136 These ports are means by which information passes to and from a computer, thus 
a port is a communication channel.137 The use of port scanning techniques enables a person to: 
1. Examine (also called probing) the services a computer us running. Port scanning can 
indicate particular characteristics of the target computer such as (a) what type of 
operating system the computer is using, and (b) what type of security software (known 
as firewalls) it is using; and to 
2. Reveal exploitable weaknesses in a computer’s security without exploiting theses 
weaknesses.138 
Perpetrators of cybercrime can use port scanning software to scan for vulnerabilities in the 
computer network, to determine which malware or other cyber threat will work in gaining 
entry into the network, or damage the network. Port scanning is often used as a precursor 
to other forms of cyber-attacks.  
2.1.9. Website defacement 
This form of cyber attack is often used by hacktivist, who seek to get a message or their point 
of view through. Cyber defacement is conducted through a hack of an organisations or an 
individual’s website, whereby an unauthorised post in the form of a text message or graphic is 
uploaded on the site. The most used form of defacement is through SQL139injections used to 
                                                          
133 Ibid.  
134 L Edwards ‘Dawn of the death of distributed denial of services: How to kill zombies’ (2006) 24 (23) Cardozo 
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal at 23. 
135M Tsuchiya ‘Japan’s response to cyber threats in the surveillance age’ (2015-2016) 7 Section Hall Journal of 
Diplomacy and international Relations 9. 
136 E J Ebersohn ‘Internet law: Port scanning and ping flooding- a legal perspective’ (2003) 66 Journal for 
Contemporary Roman Dutch law THTHR 563 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.  
139 SQL is a domain-specific language used in programming and designed for managing data held in a relational 
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log on to an administrators accounts.140 The message is one that criticises the site, a particular 
individual or an organisation.141 The extent to what a website defacement can occur varies. The 
hacker could attack one site, or potentially hundreds or thousands of sites.  It is worth noting 
that while website defacement can vary as to the number of sites attacked/hacked, the 
defacement of websites does not necessarily damage the targeted site, but hijacks the site to 
convey their message, text or graphic.142 This, while not causing substantial harm, often 
provides the attacker with some symbolic fulfilment. 
 
2.1.10. Subverting the supply chain 
  
Due to the real time connectivity facilitated by a technology based maritime industry, this type 
of attack is tremendously popular in the maritime sector. An ICT supply chain compromise is 
defined as  
An occurrence within the ICT supply chain whereby an adversary jeopardises the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system or the information the system processes, 
stores, or transmits. An ICT supply chain compromise can occur anywhere within the system 
development life cycle of the production or service.143 
Subverting the supply chain consists of attacking a company or ship, whereby software, 
equipment or supporting services being delivered to the ship or company are compromised.144 
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2.2. Incidents of maritime cyber attacks 
Incidents of maritime cyber attacks have become very prevalent in recent years.  
 
2.2.1. Deleting carrier information as to the location of cargo 
Cargo is undoubtedly one of the most valuable components in the shipping industry supply 
chain and enables goods, such as food, clothing and machinery, to be transported from one area 
to another.145 The smuggling of cargo consists of bringing prohibited goods into a country or 
stealing merchandise for which duty has not been paid.146 The cargo supply chain is thus 
susceptible to illegal and unauthorised access by criminals and terrorist groups. Because of the 
key role that cargo plays in international trade we will now examine the cyber threats to cargo 
shipping.147  
In August 2011 the state owned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (hereafter referred to 
as IRISL) was the target of a malicious cyber attack.148 The IRISL lost all data relating to their 
rates, loading, and cargo number date and place and eliminated the company’s internal 
communication network, leading to cargo simply disappearing, while other cargo was sent to 
the wrong destination. This had devastating financial consequences for the shipping liner.149  
2.2.2. Barcode scanners used as hacking devices 
This type of cyber attack consists of an attack hidden within a piece of hardware.150 The cyber 
threat was malware that was preloaded in a newly manufactured scanner, which compromised 
at least eight logistics and shipping companies.  “When the scanners were plugged into the 
company’s network it launched a series of automated attacks searching the company network 
for the ERP financial server”.151 Once this process had been completed the company’s network 
would be compromised, opening the network to a remote connection by the attackers, who 
would then have access into the financial system and the ability to modify the shipping database 
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and thereby tapering with the location of packages.152 The accesses provided to the attackers 
by the weaponised malware meant that the attackers could circumvent most of the company’s 
security measures and have near complete control of the enterprise perimeter.153 This form of 
hardware attack has been termed ‘Zombie Zero’. TrapX labs discovered this form of attack in 
2014. According to a TrapX report, the attacks appeared to originate from a location near 
Lanxiang University in China, however tracing the source of the attack is very difficult as 
sophisticated methods are being used to remove the coders “signature” and hide the true origin 
of the attack.154 
2.2.3. “Icefog”| 
In 2013, information pertaining to a form of attacked dubbed “Icefog”, was released by security 
company Kaspersky.155 The aim of the attack was to provide the cyber  perpetrator with 
backdoor access into a targeted company or organisations, in order to extract data, documents, 
email accounts and passwords as well as gain access to the resources within the company’s or 
organisation’s network.156 The attacks were mainly aimed at Korean and Japanese targets, 
covering a range of business sectors, including the shipbuilding and maritime sector.157 
“Icefog” attacks utilise spear-fishing attacks to attempt to trick a victim into opening malicious 
emails or websites. There after the cyber perpetrator has access to the victim’s data and can 
initiate lateral movement tolls to steal or modify data.158 According to Kaspersky, “the attackers 
masked their backdoor entry using Fucobha:”159 
The “Icefog” backdoor set (also known as Fucobha) is an interactive espionage tool that is 
directly controlled by the attackers. There are versions for both Microsoft Word and Mac iOS 
X.  
Unlike many forms of cyber-attacks were the aim is to maintain access into a network over 
extended period of time, “Icefog” attacks are focused and the malware often expires in a short 
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period of time. “Icefog” does not infiltrate data; the operators perform actions directly on the 
victims live system instead.160  
 
2.2.4. Ghost shipping 
In 2011 an organised crime group, consisting of drug smugglers enlisted the assistance of 
Belgian hackers, infiltrated the computerised tracking systems in the port of Antwerp, to gain 
access to container location and security details.161 The Belgian hackers were able to gain 
access to management systems within two piers in the port.162The group was able to identify 
which containers had a consignment of drugs hidden in them and were later able drive away 
from the port, retrieve the consignment of drugs by producing false bills of lading then taking 
custody of the container, all while being undetected.  This happened for a period of two 
years.163 Once the breach in the ports management systems had been identified, the port 
installed firewalls. However, the hackers physically penetrated the port and installed “wireless 
bridges on the operating computers, which allowed them direct access to the operating 
system”.164 Ghost shipping is therefore the term coined to describe thus type of cyber invasion 
of the cargo management systems. When the authorities were alerted, a raid on the groups hide-
out uncovered hacking devices, drugs, €1.3 million in cash, and firearms.165  
A similar attack was discovered in Australia in 2012. The cargo system controlled by the 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Agency was compromised by a group of 
hackers who worked for a criminal syndicate. The penetration of the cargo systems “allowed 
criminals to check whether the shipping containers were regarded as suspicious by police or 
customs authorities”166. As a result of having access to this information the criminals would 
either abandoned the shipping container containing contraband items, if they felt that the 
authorities were suspicious of it, or retrieve the containers that were not deemed suspicious. 167 
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2.3. Defining maritime cyber security threat perpetrators  
While it is important to consider the security measure and legal framework that is in place in 
combating maritime cyber security, a holistic review of the security measures in place would 
not be complete without identifying the perpetrators of maritime cybercrimes and the key traits 
which must be considered when exploring the threat role that these perpetrators play in the 
malicious use of computer systems. It is thus prudent to identify these actors and what their 
roles are. 
Malicious actors can cause disruptions to shipping vessels, as well to the timely functioning of  
ports. In the past the key players in cybercrimes has been limited to individuals who have an 
in depth knowledge of computer systems and “mastery of computer languages, computer 
programming, or network architect”.168 The reality in the status quo is very different. The 
growing number of people with access to knowledge of how computer systems work, through 
integration of information technology in their personal and business lives, has increased the 
number of potential cybercrime perpetrators.169 The access to this information is also widely 
available on the internet which also increases the number of potential cyber criminals or 
perpetrators. Social engineering attacks have been used by criminal and political organisations 
for their personal gain or to put through a certain view.170 Although cybercrime perpetrators 
take many different forms “they seek to exploit vulnerabilities created by the design to 
implementation of hardware, software, protocols and networks to achieve a wide range of 
political or economic effects”.171 
2.3.1. Individuals 
2.3.1.1. Insiders (Employees and ex-employees) 
Individuals within a company are often familiar with the company’s computer networks and 
the intellectual property assets stores within a company. This makes it easier for them to act in 
a malicious manner when they are disgruntled. 172 An insider threat can be defined as “a current 
or former employee, contractor or business partner who: has or had authorised access to an 
organisation’s network, system or data can bypass existing physical and electronic security 
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measures through legitimate measures”.173 There are many reason that could potentially 
motivate insiders to carry out a cyber attack on a company or organisation, these include 
“greed, financial gain, and anger at employer or dissatisfaction at work, blackmail, and 
ideology or split loyalty”. 174  
One of the most famous, or infamous depending on which side of the coin one falls under, 
insiders to highlight the threat of insiders in cyber security is Edward Snowden. In 2012 and 
2013 Edward Snowden leaked classified documents, relating the National Security Agency’s 
spying program, to journalist from the Guardian and the Washington Post. Intelligence sources 
reported that Snowden did not use any sophisticated software or device, but rather used thumb 
drives to explicit vulnerabilities in the NSA’s outdated security system that gave him access to 
the NSA’s sever and remove approximately 20 000 documents without ever being detected. 175 
Snowden developed his skill and talent in computer and technology through online forums and 
friends, on his own accord.176 He was hired by the CIA as a computer systems administrator 
and was given top secret clearance. 177  
2.3.1.2. Criminals  
Criminal networks often do not possess any technical knowledge, and are typically looking for 
financial gains to support their illicit criminal activities.178 These individuals or groups are 
usually already active in the maritime sector through various means including vessel high 
jacking, theft in cargo, drug smuggling etc.179 Cyber criminals is possession of technical can 
choose to work on their own or to work for other crime syndicates. 
2.3.1.3. Non-malicious individuals 
People seeking no harm or material gains may also compromise the computer network systems 
of a company or port. This happens when tech savvy individuals or experimenters gain access 
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to a network system without the permission or knowledge of the owner which may cause 
accidental damage.180 Human error, caused by negligence or lack of knowledge of certain 
technical upgrades, by outsourced individuals on a ship could also lead to a breach in computer 
network systems.181  
 
2.3.2. Terrorists 
Though not the focus of this dissertation, cyber terrorism is well worth discussing in greater 
degree. The threat of cyber terrorism is certainly a major concern to all nations, this largely due 
to the fact that it offers the attacker a degree of anonymity, unlike any other form of terrorist 
threat in the world.182 The ever changing nature of ICT systems in the maritime field also makes 
maritime cyber security very difficult to legally regulate, even though cyber terrorist attacks 
have been occurring for decades.183 From the inception of the United Nations, safety and 
security has always been at the forefront, with Article One stating that the purpose and principle 
of the United Nations is184: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace. 
Considering the above, all states should have regulatory measures in place to regulate maritime 
cyber terrorism as this would be an integral part of maintaining international peace and security. 
There is no universally accepted definition of cyber terrorism, and current definitions range 
from narrow definitions to broader definitions.185Although cyber terrorism is often referred to 
as a terrorist attack conducted in the cyberspace dominion, a formal definition by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), defines “Cyber terrorism as the use of computer 
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network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (e.g. energy, transportation, 
government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population”.186 
According to Tafoya, cyber terrorism is “the intimidation of civilian enterprise through the use 
of high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in 
disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information”.187 Cyber terrorist are therefore 
non-state actors who directly participate on hostilities in support of terrorist groups such al-
Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban, by using cyber network assets or carrying out their attack in the 
cyber domain.188 The definition put forward by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 
“cyber terrorism is the premeditated, publically motivated attack against information, 
information systems computer programmes and data, resulting in violence against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”.189  
All economic domains are controlled to a high degree by electronic networks, these include, 
the banking and financial sector, air traffic control, Geographic Positioning Systems (GPS) in 
the transportation industry etc., the objective of cyber terrorism is thus to alter or destroy 
information of strategic value through these terrorist attacks.190 It is clear from the above 
definitions that while there is no universally accepted definition of cyber terrorism, for an attack 
to qualify as cyber terrorism it has to be a deliberate attack, which leads to violence against 
property of persons, or generate fear, with the perpetrators have some form of terror group 
allegiance.191  
One of the biggest areas of vulnerabilities in maritime security, and especially to port security, 
is containerised shipments.192 World seaborne trade amounted to 10.3 billion tons in 2016.193 
According to Transnet Port Terminals194 2018 Report the expected number of containers 
entering South African Port is set to be 4.5 million TEUs.195 Richard Mallabone of the South 
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African Association of Freight Forwarders (Saaff) reported that South Africa has never been 
able to report to the government on reliable container inspection in South Africa, as there has 
never been a database containing those statistics.196 Mallabone stated that currently manual 
manifests were used to manage the inspection of containers, which includes the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) stopping container at random or stopping containers based on the 
description that is provided on the container. These obstacles are heightened by the fact the 
South African Revenue Services (SARS) has a technology database in place containing 
valuable information about shipping containers, but will not share this information with 
SAPS.197 This inability to efficiently and effectively inspect the goods that are potentially being 
transported into the country leaves South Africa particularly vulnerable to terrorist using 
shipping containers  transport weapons of mass destruction or use cyber vulnerabilities in the 
computer networks to conceal the shipment of weapons or to conceal terrorist themselves as 
stowaways.198 In October 2001 a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist was found in a container, on 
board a commercial container vessel, which was destined for Halifax in Canada from Gioia 
Tauro, a southern Italian port.199 The container was fitted with a toilet, bed and food. The 
suspected Egyptian al-Qaeda terrorist, had in his possession a cellular phone, laptop computer 
and a satellite telephone as well as forged identity documentation.200 This illustrates that the 
porous nature of container shipments to maritime cyber terrorism should be an area of great 
concern to legal minds and legislators of all states and more so for a country like South Africa 
which has the two biggest ports in Africa.201 
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2.3.3. Hacktivist 
Hacktivism is a worldwide phenomenon that is increasingly becoming a “popular form of 
protest”.202 Social activism203 has been utilised by different groups and people for many years, 
with the increased reliance on technology and the world as a whole become more 
interconnected, it is therefore not surprising that this form of social activism is being used more 
often. The right to freedom of expression204 is the legal structure offered in many jurisdiction 
including South Africa205, that supports civil disobedience and legitimate protect action. 
Hacktivism has been defined as “the nonviolent use of ‘illegal or legally ambiguous digital 
tools’ like website defacement, information theft, website parodies, DoS attacks, virtual sit-ins 
and virtual sabotage, motivated not by personal or individual gains but by larger social, moral 
or political agenda.”206 Hacktivist are individuals engaging in similar forms of disruptive 
activities, to “highlight a political or social case”.207  Hacktivist believe that information should 
not be restricted and that it is the right of all individuals to have access to that information.208 
One of the most well-known hacktivist group is “Anonymous”. The group has made many 
mainstream media headlines, their most prominent one, being the campaign in January 2008 
against the Church of Scientology. The Church of Scientology had attempted to suppress the 
publication of information regarding the church by internet media outlets.209 The magnitude of 
the campaign saw more than 6000 participants of Anonymous’s operation dubbed “Project 
Chanology” protest in 90 city streets all over the world wearing the group’s signature Guy 
Fawke’s masks.210 
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The most contentious issue surrounding hacktivism, the discussion of which is important for 
completeness of any discussion pertaining to hacktivism, is the matter of whether cyber 
hacktivism should be classified as a legitimate, legal form of socio-political public protest or a 
cybercrime necessitating harsh legal action?  
In recent years, especially in the United States of America, there has been a move to 
characterise hacktivist as people to be feared rather than socio-political activist.211 The dawn 
of a new technology era means activism will not only be limited to real life, physical 
demonstrations, but that cyber activism or hacktivism will also play a role protest action and 
civil disobedience.212 The “United States of America’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA)”213 was codified by Congress to regulate a variety of computer crimes in 1984. 
Amongst other things the CFAA criminalised the intentional accessing of a computer without 
authorisation.214 The indictment of Aaron Hillel Swartz brought the focus of the wide cast net 
of the acts criminalised by the CFAA. Swartz was an American computer programmer, whose 
work focused on civic awareness and activism.215 Swartz was arrested in 2011 after he 
connected a computer to the “Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)” network, in and 
undisclosed closet, and systematically downloaded approximately 4.8 million academic 
journals form JSTOR.216 Swartz was charged with 11 felony charges carrying a maximum of 
1 million dollar fine and 35 years in prison.217 At the time of his arrest, Swartz had not 
distributed any of the downloaded files. The act has since been amended in 1989, 1994, and 
1996 and in 2001 by the USA Patriot Act, 2002, and in 2008 by the Identity Theft Enforcement 
and Restitution Act, which have expanded the list of acts that fell within the ambit of actions 
that could be prosecuted. These amendments have received some opposition as ordinary 
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internet use can easily become a legal violation because of the218 interpretation of 
“unauthorised user”. This prompted Representative Zoe Lofgren to propose a Bill (Aaron’s 
Law) that would amend the CFAA and prevent the disproportionate charges brought against 
Swartz, because of the broad scope of the CFAA, from being brought against others.219 Further, 
this severe punishment of hacktivist is imposed because the technology that hacktivists use is 
often misunderstood.220 This push for hard punishment is fuelled by the fact that hacktivist are 
a large group of people who are seemingly difficult to identify, and often what unites them is 
just a shared ideology.221 
The law in the United Kingdom (UK) that deals with cybercrime is the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 (CMA), the effects of which, are very similar to that of the USA. Section 3 of the CMA 
states: 
It shall be an offence to impair the operation of any computer, to prevent or hinder 
access to any program or data held in any computer and to impair the operation of any 
such program or reliability of any such data.222 
The CMA, like the CFAA, casts too wide a net on the list of activities which incur criminal 
prosecution.  
Although cyber hacktivist show a frequency to cause disruption and expensive mischief, 
hacktivists have not shown a willingness to endanger the lives of people for a political cause.223 
For this reason it would seem as going too far to paint acts of hacktivism with cybercrimes in 
general. This intention, not to cause harm to civilian population is a very important distinction, 
as it differentiates hacktivism form other cybercrimes such as cyber terrorism and cyberwar.224 
It is argued by O’Malley, that so long as forms of hacktivism “1) are expressive in nature, 2) 
are performed without anonymity, with actors willing to take responsibility, 3) have a 
legitimate purpose, 4) proportionately balances the damage or disruption with the benefits to 
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be achieved, and 5) are non-violent,”225 they should be afforded the protection of legitimate 
forms of protest given under the right to freedom of expression, to which I agree. 
In the maritime industry, hacktivists seek to publicly put pressure on the shipping industry, for 
a specific objective for either environmental concerns 226 or prevention of handling of specific 
cargoes because they are unethical or will endanger the lives of a population. The target may 
be the shipping company’s computer network, the ship itself or third party suppler of recipient 
of the cargo.227 
2.4. The effects that threat actors seek to achieve 
There are different reasons that maritime cyber security threat actors seek to achieve. These 
outcomes maybe aimed at the ship or ship subsystem or the overall business. These include: 
1. “Destroy - examples may include the destruction of cargo, ship, or port such that they 
are no longer available for use.228 
2. Degrade - examples may include impacting the speed or manoeuvrability of the ship, 
the ability to navigate accurately or monitor the local environment accurately to the 
point where the ability of the ship to operate is significantly impaired.229 
3. Deny - examples may include the denial of access to ship systems or information/data 
possibly for such reasons as extortion for financial gain or to mount a physical attack 
on the ship for kidnapping and ransom purposes.230 
4. Delay - examples may include to delay the timely operation of the ship or ship 
subsystem such that the knock-on effect may impact business operations or cause 
penalties to be incurred.231 
5. Deter - examples may include influencing the business from operating in certain areas 
of the world oceans, operating in specific markets or accessing specific ports from a 
commercial perspective.232 
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6. Detect - examples may include the detection of people cargo or ship locations and o 
track such that planned physical theft or cargo manipulation might take place.233 
7. Distract - examples include the ability to alter the state of a sensor so to provide a 
distraction whilst a data /information extraction takes place. 234 
This list is not exhaustive”.235 
 
2.5. Cyber vulnerabilities In Marine Transportation Systems 
The devices and information systems used in the maritime industry are not immune to cyber 
threats. While these information and communications technology (ICT) systems and computer 
networks facilitate increased functionality and accessibility for the industry, which results in 
efficient operations, these ICT systems and computer networks face complex and unique 
vulnerabilities.236 These vulnerabilities can arise from deficiencies or inadequacies in the 
design of different software and hardware, integration of and maintenance of the Industrial 
Control System (ICS) which remotely carry and assess information are on-board most modern 
ships and in onshore infrastructures that support them,237  as well as lapses in cyber-discipline 
in the network systems of different.238 These ICS are often available immediately and are not 
specially made to suit a particular purpose.239 
2.5.1. On board a ship 
Commercial shipping companies are irreversibly reliant on Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS)240 which have replaced paper charts in vessels.241 GNNS signals are 
vulnerable to: 
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1. Jamming and Interference. “The broadcast of stronger signals that intentionally or 
unintentionally blocks or impacts a GNSS satellite signal”.242 
2. Spoofing. “The broadcasting of false GNSS signals at slightly greater power. This 
deceives the GNSS receiver into locking onto the spoofed signal. Once the receiver has 
locked onto the stronger spoofed signal, the false signal gradually phases out of sync 
with the actual; GNSS signal, causing the receiver to report false Positioning 
Navigation and timing (PNT)”.243 
3. Meaconing. “The intentional delay and rebroadcasting of a GNSS signal intended to 
introduce error to receive”.244 
Security vulnerabilities in maritime navigation equipment that use GPS (Global Positioning 
System) as a data input, include the ability to download, read, replace or delete any file stored 
on machines hosting ECDIS.245 Close to a million ships have Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) transceivers,246 which track ships automatically and electronically link positional data 
with other ships. A major flaw in AIS lies in the fact that AIS information in assumed to be 
genuine, “there is not built-in security or verification system that provides a level of backup”.247 
This means that hackers could hack into a ships system and falsify a vessels position, identity 
or type, speed and heading.248 
2.5.2. Oil rigs: 
A Dynamic Positioning (DP) is “a computer-controlled system to automatically maintain the 
positioning (and heading) of a vessel, and in particular of an oil rig”249 The stability of an 
offshore rig is dependent on the correct information being fed into a computer program, with 
information such as wind direction, speed, the position and angle of the rig etc.250 
2.5.3. Cargo: 
Cargo handling systems and the management thereof, are now highly digital.251 Criminals 
could thus remotely access the schedule of their containers, through malware that spoofs the 
                                                          
242 Ibid at 7. 
243 Ibid at 7. 
244 Ibid at 7 
245 DiRenzo (n 9 above). 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid.  
248 Ibid.  
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
36 
 
system into believing that a regular transactions is taking place, containing illegal substances 
and releasing them to themselves without being detected.  
2.5.4. Port operations 
Today port operations rely on the complex network of systems and data flow between logistic 
companies, IT providers, cargoes, crew and vessels.252 These include the use gantry cranes now 
using optical recognition to manage port operations, electronic devices to locate cargo, moving 
containers automatically using GPS, trucks that transport cargo are also heavily dependent on 
GPS.253  This interconnectivity makes ports vulnerable to hackers entering a virus on one 
system and subsequently connecting to other devices in the port. 
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 CHAPTER 3: 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING MARITIME CYBERSECURITY 
 
3.1. International conventions and guidelines 
3.1.1. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” 
Trade, travel and conflict have always been a part of the maritime domain. This Chapter 
examines the relevant international conventions and guidelines that relate to maritime cyber 
security threats internationally. A discussion on regional Conventions, in particular the African 
Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection and the European 
Convention on Cyber Crimes will follow. Lastly South Africa’s domestic legal framework will 
be examined. 
On the 10th December 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea254 was 
opened up for signatures. The broad base legal framework saw the participation of over 150 
countries, culminating in 14 years of working on the drafting of the convention.255 UNCLOS 
incorporated the “Convention on the High Seas”.256 The customary laws governing the 
navigational freedom of the sea were codified in UNCLOS.257 This legal regime establishes 
governance of the high seas as one that has “immunity from national appropriation and 
establishes multilateral governance by treaty, and a limitation on use to only ‘peaceful 
purposes’”.258 Two noteworthy articles in UNCLOS can be interpreted to deal with cyber-
attacks at sea. Article 19 affords vessel safe passage in another countries territorial water,259 
barring the following prohibited acts: 
a) “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal state, or in any other manner in violation of the principles 
of international law embodied in the Charter if the United Nations; 
… 
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c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of defence or security of the 
coastal state; 
d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal state; 
… 
k) any act aimed at interfering with any system of communication or any other facilities 
or installations if the coastal state…”260 
 
Though not explicitly provided for, these acts could be read to mean the cyber threats on 
computer networks systems on board a vessel mentioned in chapter two above. Article 109 (a) 
states that “All states should cooperate in the suppression of unauthorised broadcasting from 
the high seas”.261 These prohibited acts could extend to unauthorised penetration of a ship’s 
cyber network.262 
3.1.2. “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation(SUA)” 
The cyber threats to the maritime industry, mentioned in  the previous chapter, illustrate why 
it is necessary for the international community to prepare for and deter cyber threats in order 
to maintain safety and security in the maritime industry. Many maritime incidents have 
attracted the attention of the international community, of these incidents there are a number of 
notable ones that prompted the international maritime security authorities to draft a regulatory 
framework, as a response.263 The seizure of the Achille Lauro, is one such incident. The case 
involved the seizure of an Italian-flag ship on the 7th of October 1985, by members of the 
Palestine Liberation Front, a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) who had 
boarded the ship and held the passengers and the crew.264 The hijackers, who had posed as 
tourist, threatened to kill the passengers unless 50 Palestinians were released from prisons.265 
This prompted the drafting of a resolution on maritime terrorism266 and in 1986, the 
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International Maritime Organisation (IMO) established an Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee, 
open to all states, to consider a convention against maritime terrorism, based on a draft 
submitted by Austria, Egypt and Italy. 267 The Convention for the “Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention)” was adopted and 
opened for signatures in March 1988, at a conference in Rome268. This Convention provided 
for a range of acts “connected with attacks against ships or persons on board a ship.”269 The 
purpose of the SUA Convention, which South Africa has signed and ratified,270 is to ensure 
that persons who commit unlawful acts against a ship, have the appropriate action taken against 
them.271 Though the SUA Convention does not make specific mention to cyber security, Article 
3 lists the acts which if done intentionally or unlawfully, would render 272individuals guilty of 
committing an offence if: 
1. “Seizes or exercises control over ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation; or… 
3. Destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the ship; or 
4. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance 
which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which 
endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or  
5. destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with 
their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship”. 
The “Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (The 2005 Protocol)”273 made the following amendments to the 
SUA Convention. 
Article 3, paragraph 1(f) of the convention is replaced by the following text: 
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(f) “Communicates information which that person knows to be false, thereby 
endangering the safe navigation of a ship.”274 
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 
2 Any person also commits an offence if that person threatens, with or without a 
condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or 
juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences set 
forth in paragraphs 1 (b), (c), and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the ship in question.275 
Article 3bis was added and in effect holds that when the purpose of an act, by its nature or 
context is to intimidate a population, or compel a government or an international organisation 
to do or abstain from doing any act that uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious…276 
if done unlawfully and unintentionally that person commits an offence as per the Convention. 
The act also makes mention of “any equipment, materials or software or relate Technology”277, 
however, this is only as it relates to biochemical weapons.  
Though the 2005 Protocol , have gone a long way in  ensuring that the security framework 
established under the SUA Convention is capable of responding to contemporary maritime 
threats, by “introducing offences relating to maritime terrorism; the illicit trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction”.278 Further the SUA Convention simplified several of the issues 
surrounding jurisdiction and the list of offences covered.279 However, it loses its power and 
relevance if it cannot be applied to sui generis emerging threats to transportation, such as 
maritime cyber threats. The wording of both the SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol is 
broad enough to include some of the cyber threats listed in chapter 2. If the nature of the cyber 
threats listed in chapter two, is such that they interfere with the safe navigation of a ship, then 
a wide interpretation of the Convention would mean that those cyber threat perpetrators would 
be guilty of an offence, giving states that are party to this convention the right and duty to 
respond. For example a cyber attack on an oil carrier, that would disrupt the navigation or 
steering of the vessel, resulting in the vessel grounding, could cause an oil spill and have 
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devastating effects to the environment. A shortfall in this broad list of acts that constitute an 
offence under the Convention, as it pertains to cyber security, would be the interpretation of 
different words and provisions. As it stands there is no consensus as to the meaning of maritime 
security280, and maritime cyber security has also seen many different definitions being attached 
to what it is. Article 4 (2) of the 2005 is a good example of this problem in interpretation. The 
words “Communicates information” necessitate further interpretation when it comes to cyber 
security, does this mean that the person has to physically communicate this information? 
Malware and coding allow hackers to remotely communicate information into computer 
networks, which could give hackers’ access to the GPS of a ship or alter the direction of a ship. 
Lastly while the SUA Convention provides states with a positive obligation to either extradite 
or prosecute offenders281, the nature of maritime cybercrimes give the perpetrators the 
advantage of anonymity, which “enables the hacker to obviate checkpoints or any physical 
evidence being traceable to him or her” which would make the issues of jurisdiction and 
extradition obsolete as there would be no identified perpetrator.282  
 
3.1.3. “International Ship and Port Facility Security Code” 
The IMO is the regulatory body of the United Nations entrusted with the responsibility for 
safety of life at sea and environmental protection. Devastating world events, which threatened 
maritime security, have prompted the IMO to draft regulations and conventions to respond to 
such events. One such incident was the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade 
Centre in the USA, launched in September 11 2001.283 After discussions of the vulnerability 
of international maritime community and vessels at sea, the IMO drafted maritime security 
instruments including Assembly resolution A.924 (22) in November 2001.284 The aim of the 
resolution was “to reduce risks to passengers, crews and port personnel on board ships and in 
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port areas and to the vessels and their cargoes and to enhance ship and port security and avert 
shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism”.285 As a result of the resolution, the 
IMO adopted a number of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended.286 The 2002 SOLAS Conference was held in the London 
headquarters of the IMO, from the 9th to the 13th of December 2002. The “International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)” was enshrined under Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 
on 1 July 2004. This code together with the other amendments to SOLAS 1974, seeks to 
establish an international framework of security-related “standards” to be achieved by different 
stakeholders, including governments, local governments , local administrators and port and 
shipping authorities.287  
The ISPS code is divided into two parts, a mandatory section (Part A) and a recommendatory 
section (Part B). The code requires ships on the high seas and ports that serve them to take 
appropriate preventative measure against security threats, conduct security assessments, 
develop security plans, have designated security officers and conduct training and drills.288 
Being a signatory of IMO, South Africa has ratified and implemented the ISPS Code.289 The 
ISPS Code has been given effect by the “Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 
2004”290(hereinafter referred to as Regulations 2004) which are enabled under section 356 of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1951.291 The discussion of the requirements for international ship 
and port security will be discussed below.  
3.1.4. Maritime Industry Practice Guidelines 
There have been significant developing threats to maritime cyber security in recent years. 
While the international community have recognised the seriousness of these threats and the 
possible magnitude of their consequences, these threats have been subject to comparatively 
less regulations and guidelines. 
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3.1.4.1. International Maritime Organisation 
In its ninety-sixth session (from 11 May 2016 to 20 May 2016), having regard to the urgent 
need to raise cyber awareness on cyber vulnerabilities and threats in shipping, the Maritime 
Safety Committee approved the “Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.292 
Article one of the guidelines states that the guidelines aim to provide “high level 
recommendations for maritime cyber risk management.”293 The IMO guidelines were designed 
to be incorporated with existing industry regulations and procedures, referencing both the 
BIMCO guidelines and the NIST Framework. These recommendatory guidelines focus on a 
risk management approach, which is defined as “the process of identifying, analysing, 
assessing, and communicating a cyber-related risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring, or 
mitigating it to an acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of actions taken to 
stakeholders.”294 Both the IMO Guideline and the NIST Framework focus on the same five 
functional elements to sustain a culture of risk awareness, which are concurrent and 
continuous,295 namely: 
1. “Identify: Define personnel roles and responsibilities for cyber risk management and 
identify the systems, assets, data and capabilities that, when disrupted, pose risks to ship 
operations.”296 
2. “Protect: Implement risk control processes and measures, and contingency planning to 
protect against a cyber-event and ensure continuity of shipping operations.”297 
3. “Detect: Develop and implement activities necessary to detect a cyber-event in a timely 
manner.”298 
4. “Respond: Develop and implement activities and plans to provide resilience and to restore 
systems necessary for shipping operations or services impaired due to a cyber-event.”299 
5. “Recover: Identify measures to back-up and restore cyber systems necessary for shipping 
operations impacted by a cyber-event.”300 
While the guidelines may be a good tool for smaller shipping companies, ships with complex 
cyber related systems would require additional resources through reputable industry and 
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Government partners301 The guidelines are also recommendatory, as stated in section 2.2 of 
Annexure 1, and thus hold no real obligations on shipping companies and shipping nations on 
how to implement good cyber risk management tools.302 The MSC Guidelines, though they 
recognised the issue at hand, were broad and not specific enough on a number of issues, 
including their application, response and deterrence of maritime cyber threats.303 
The IMO amended two of their general security management codes in 2017 to explicitly 
include cyber security. The ISPS and the International Safety Management Code (ISM)304 
provide direction on how ship operators and port officials should regulate cyber risk 
management processes.305 Resolution MSC.428 (98) Maritime Cyber Risk Management in 
Safety Management Systems306”was adopted on 16 June 2017. The Resolution affirms “that an 
approved safety management system should take into account cyber risk management in 
accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM code”307 and 
encourages “administrators to ensure that the cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety 
management systems not later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of 
Compliance after 1 January 2021”308  
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and other influential maritime 
organisations309 sought to change this by releasing “The Guidelines on Cyber Security On 
board Ships” in February 2016.310 The IMO followed example and released interim guidelines 
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addressing cyber risk in June 2016311. These guidelines must be aligned with the 
recommendations given in the IMO’s recommendations.  
3.1.4.2. The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 
Many of the existing international safety guidelines cover security issues for on-shore 
operations. The BIMCO guidelines focused on minimum requirements for assessing operations 
and implementing the necessary procedures for maintaining cyber security on board a ship.312 
The aim of the BIMCO guidelines is to “offer guidance to ship-owners and operators on how 
to assess their operations and put in place the necessary procedures and actions to maintain the 
security of cyber systems on board their ships”313 According to the BIMCO guidelines a 
shipping companies cyber risk management policies should be seen as completing to the exiting 
security requirements contained in ISM Code314 and the ISPS Code. 
The BIMCO guidelines are split into four categories: 
1. Understanding the cyber threat 
Different “cyber risks exist that are specific to the company ship operation or trade. When a 
company assess the cyber risks that they are exposed to, they should be aware of any specific 
aspect of their operations that may increase their vulnerability to different cyber threats. In the 
same way shipping companies need to understand the cyber risks and vulnerabilities that they 
are exposed to, users of IT systems on board a ship must be aware of potential cyber security 
risk, and must be trained to identify and mitigate such risks.”315 
2. Assessing the risk 
Cyber security in a company should take a top down approach instead of being immediately 
being delegated to the Ship Security Officer (SSO) or the head of the IT department. The 
maritime industry has a range of characteristics that affect its vulnerability to cyber incidents 
and the level of these risks will reflect on the company, ship, the IT and OT systems used, and 
the information and/or data stored. Companies are encourages to utilise the (NIST) Cyber 
Security Framework 316 to qualify the approach being taken to cyber security using common 
principles and 
Standards. The guidelines also advocate for robust approaches to cyber 
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Security, both now and in the future.317 
3. Reducing the risk  
The main deliverable of a company’s cyber security strategy should be reducing the risk. At a 
technical level, this would include the necessary actions to be implemented to establish and 
maintain an agreed level of cyber security. Considerations should also be made to deal with 
occasions in the life cycle of the ship where the normal controls are invalidated. Technical 
controls should be in place to that ensure that on board systems are designed and configured to 
be resilient to cyber-attacks, as well procedural controls should be covered in company policies, 
safety management procedures, security procedures and access controls. Both technical and 
procedural controls should be compatible with the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) model for protecting data and information.318 
4. Developing contingency plans 
Ships should “have access to appropriate contingency place that are developed by companies 
in order to effectively respond to cyber incidents. Where responding to a cyber-incident is 
beyond the competencies held within the company and on board due to the complexity of the 
cyber incident or severity thereof, external experts’ assistance should be available for and 
effective response. Contingency plans should include consideration of who has decision-
making authority, when to call in external experts (and whom), as well as communication.”319 
The second addition of the BIMCO guidelines320 were released in June 2017 and build on the 
existing Version 1.0 guidelines. Are now considered to be the most comprehensive guidelines 
for the shipping community. The updated sections focus on: 
1. Cyber security and safety management 
Cyber “safety and cyber security are equally important as both have the potential to affect 
the safety of the ship, personnel on board the ship and cargo. Version 2.0 of the guidelines 
aim to provide essential guidance on managing cyber safety and cyber security” risks.321 
2. Managing Ship to shore interface 
There “is a need to control the ship to shore interface, as ships are becoming more and more 
integrated with shore side operations because digital communication is being used to 
conduct business, manage operations, and stay in touch with head office. The risks of 
misunderstood, unknown, and uncoordinated remote access to an operating ship should be 
taken into consideration as an important part of the risk assessment. The guidelines 
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recommend that companies fully understand the ships OT and IT systems and how they 
connect to the off shore side of their operations. 322” 
3. Effectively segregate networks 
Care “should be taken to understand how critical shipboard systems might be connected to 
uncontrolled networks. Stand-alone systems will be less at risk to external cyber-attacks 
compared to those to uncontrolled networks there for care has to be, further human 
interaction with these networks also has to be considered.323” 
4. Insurance Issues 
For insurers, “the term ‘cyber’ includes many different aspects and it is important to 
distinguish between them and their effects on insurance cover.” Companies should be able 
to demonstrate that they are acting with reasonable care in their approach to managing 
cyber risk and protecting the ship from any damage that may arise from a cyber-incident.324 
 
3.1.4.3. Seaworthiness  
Shipowners and operators are cautioned against ignoring these industry guidelines. If a ship 
owners systems were penetrated, and they could not show that they acted with reasonable care 
in managing cyber vulnerabilities and protecting their ship, then the ship could be unseaworthy, 
which would be a breach of the contract of carriage.325The carrier’s obligation to provide a 
seaworthy ship has always underpinned a carriage of goods contract. At common law this duty 
by the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel was absolute.326 A sea worthy vessel, as defined in 
McFadden v Blue Star327 as “a vessel must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary carful 
and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having 
regard to all the probable circumstances of it”.328 While South Africa did not ratify the Hague 
Visby Rules329, it did incorporate330 the rules into the “Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1986 (SA 
COGSA)”.331 Article III Rule 1 of the Hague Visby Rules provide that, 
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“1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: 
(a) Make the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship; 
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in 
which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.”332 
The introduction of the carriers’ obligation to exercisedue diligence, shows the shift to provide 
a lower measure of obligation as opposed to the absolute duties stipulated under common law, 
Furthermore, this duty is a positive obligation on the part of the carrier, which “must be 
discharged, in order for the carrier to be protected by Article IV (2) of the Hague Visby Rules.” 
333 Seaworthiness thus hinges on the interpretation of the term “due diligence”, which has been 
defined as “the efforts of the prudent carrier to take all reasonable measures that can be possibly 
taken, in the light of available knowledge and means at the relevant time, to fulfil his obligation 
to provide a seaworthy vessel”.334 The conclusion is therefore, that on a reading of this 
definition of the carriers obligation to exercise due diligence, where a carriers fails to the 
measures provided for in the BIMCO guidelines on cyber security, it can be said that they did 
not meet the standard required for seaworthiness. This in turn could also have ramifications for 
insurance claims. For a vessel in the current cyber maritime climate, to be seaworthy, there 
must be crew members that are specifically trained to address cybercrimes, and an adequate 
number of crew with the knowledge to address cyber threats should they become a reality. The 
ship must be equipped with critical security (both IT and OT) controls that will sufficiently 
protect a vessel against cyber-attacks.  
An assessment of the guidelines reveal that the guidelines mentioned above represent industry 
best practice to approaching maritime cyber vulnerabilities and threats. The guidelines differ 
in their scope however they encompass the same fundamental principles.335 These include, 
advocating for the NIST Framework principles into maritime cyber security approach. The 
guidelines suggest that the best way to approach cyber security is through a cyber awareness. 
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The guidelines further point out that “each entity must have knowledge and understanding of 
any protection measures already in place and the capabilities and limitations of these 
measures”.336 
 
3.2. Regional Framework 
3.2.1  African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection                                               
(AU Cyber Convention) 
ICT and internet penetration has increasingly grown in the African continent, this has in turn 
raised concerns on over the need “to promote cybersecurity governance and cyber stability in 
the continent”.337  The AU was then prompted to establish a regional treaty on cyber security. 
In “June 2014 the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
was established.”338 The AU Cyber Convention took into account the Oliver Tambo 
Declaration adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in charge of ICT, which was held 
on 5 November 2009 in Johannesburg South Africa.339 It is stated in the Preamble of the AU 
Cyber Convention that “the major obstacle to the development of electronic commerce in 
Africa are linked to security issues particularly: 
a) “The gaps affecting the regulation of legal recognition of data communications and 
electronic signature;”340 
b) “The absence of specific legal rules that protect consumers, intellectual property rights, 
personal data and information systems;”341 
c) “The absence of e-services and telecommuting legislations;”342 
d) “The application of electronic techniques to commercial and administrative acts;”343 
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e) “The probative elements introduced by digital techniques (time stamping, certification 
etc);”344 
f) “The rules applicable to cryptology devices and service;”345 
g) “The oversight of on-line advertising;”346 
h) “The absence of appropriate fiscal and customs legislations for electronic 
commerce.”347 
The goal of the AU Cyber Convention is “to address the need for harmonised legislation in the 
area of cyber security in member States of the African Union…”348 South Africa is not party 
to this convention.349 While the AU Cyber Convention does deserve praise for prioritising 
Africa’s need to address cyber security threats and cybercrimes, there have been concerns about 
the overreaching provisions of the Convention,350 as it seeks to regulate many different uses of 
ICT, which could infringe other existing rights of use of technology.351 This is of particular 
concern to countries with existing legislation that governs cyber security and cybercrimes such 
as Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and South Africa.352 The convention places onerous requirements 
for these countries to reconcile their exiting cyber laws with the Au Convention.353  
Regionally South Africa is faced with another challenge that is, the challenge of having 
competing bilateral and multilateral cybercrimes conventions, draft works and model laws, 
cyber instruments available to it in Africa. These include 
 “East African Draft Legal Framework for Cyber Laws (2008)”;354 
 “Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Draft Directive On 
Fighting Cybercrime (2009)”;355 
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 “Common Market for Southern Africa (COMESA) Cyber Security Draft Model Bill 
(2011)”;356 
 “Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Model Law On Computer Crime 
and Cybercrime (2012)”.357 
These regional instruments champion the cause of developing the legal framework on a 
regional scale that governs cyber security. The real challenge for the South African legislature 
will be deciding which Conventions it decides to be party to and ratify with the understanding 
that South Africa is a Constitutional democracy and the Constitutional values of privacy, 
freedom of expression and right to security will have to be taken into consideration.  
3.2.2 European Convention on Cyber Crimes (ECCC) 
The Council of Europe, in an attempt to address the issue of the increasing number of countries 
falling victim to cybercrimes, decided to draft the Convention on cybercrimes. The Convention 
on Cyber Crimes (The Budapest Convention)358 was open for signatories in a conference held 
in Budapest on 23 November 2018.359 The purpose of the ECCC, amongst other things, is to 
combat cybercrime on an international level and the universal harmonisation of laws relating 
to cyber offenses, prosecution and punishment.360 The premise on which this international 
treaty was built on is that cybercrimes are a new category of crime, necessitating their own 
legal framework.361 The ECCC mandates signatories to: 
“Each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole 
or any part of a computer system without right.”362 
The Convention contains four parts. Part I contains the definitions section. Part II consists of 
the provisions that deal with substantive and procedural law and measures to be taken at a 
domestic level. The substantive law provisions cover criminalisation provisions by creating 
nine offences grouped into four categories.363 These nine offences pertain to illegal access, data 
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interference; computer related forgery; illegal interception system interference; misuse of 
devices; offences related to child pornography;  computer related fraud as well as copyright 
and neighbouring rights.364 Section 2 of chapter two deals with the procedural provision by 
first establishing that the Convention applies to any offence carried through by means of a 
computer system or the evidence of which takes an electronic form.365 It then sets out 
procedural provisions relating to “expedited preservation of stored data; expedited preservation 
and partial; disclosure of traffic data; production order; search and seizure of computer data; 
real-time collection of traffic data; interception of content data”.366 Lastly the first Chapter 
details the Jurisdiction provisions.367  Article 22 of the Budapest Convention requires states 
that are party to the Convention to adopt legislative measures that establish jurisdiction in 
accordance with Article 3 through 11 of the Budapest Convention,368 when an offence is 
committed: 
a) “In its territory;”369 or 
b) “On board a ship flying the flag of that Party;”370 or 
c) “On board and aircraft registered under the laws of that Party;”371 or  
d) “By one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was 
committed or if the offence committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any 
State.”372 
Because the jurisdiction provisions of the Budapest are linked to the state and not focused on 
the perpetrator, the Budapest Convention progressively allows a state to exercise its 
jurisdictional powers “in a computer crime involving a computer system within its territory, 
even if the perpetrator committed the offense form a remote location outside of the state”373 
Part III consists of international co-operation and the final chapter, chapter IV consists of 
miscellaneous provisions that are generic to most Conventions.  
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While South Africa is the only African county to sign the ECCC, it still has to ratify and accede 
to the ECCC.374 South Africa is in compliance with part one of the  Budapest Convention, with 
the enactment of ECT Act and RICA which mandates member states to375: 
1. “Criminalise the illegal access to computer systems, 
2. Illegal interception of data to a computer system, 
3. Interfering with computer systems without right, intentional interference with 
computer data without right, 
4. Use of inauthentic data with intent to put it across as authentic (data forgery), 
5. Infringement of copyright related rights online, 
6. Interference with data or functioning of computer system, 
7. Child pornography related offences (which are also covered in the Copy right Act376 
and The Film and Publications Act377)” 
The practical implications of the ECCC, are a cause for great concern. The ECCC does not 
recognise universal jurisdiction and relies the use of domestic laws and cyber cooperation for 
prosecution of cyber perpetrators.378Although the convention seeks universal harmonisation of 
laws relating to cyber offences, it is not recognised as reflecting customary international 
norms379 and for states that are victim to cyber attacks the difficulty lies in the 
implementation.380 
 
3.3. Domestic legal framework 
National governments have started realise the need for adopting cybersecurity strategies to 
address the wide range of cyber threats. Africa has long been considered as an opportune place 
to commit cybercrime, due to very weak network and information security.381 The complex 
issues surrounding cyber security span all government instructions, as well as in all private 
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sectors. This is need is for robust regulation is further exacerbated by the increasing reliance 
on technological advancements. This section will examine the South African government’s 
responses to maritime cyber security threats.  
3.3.1. Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004382 
The Regulations, to the MSA , 2004 apply to all seven of South Africa’s major ports namely 
Durban, Cape Town, Richards Bay, Mossel Bay, Saldanha, Port Elizabeth and East London.383 
The Key purpose of the Regulations 2004 is to: 
1. “safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime transport”384 
2. “achieve this purpose, these regulations establish a regulatory framework 
centred around the development of security plans for ships and other maritime 
transport operations”385 
3. “the implementation of this framework will enable the Republic to meet its 
obligations under Chapter XI-2 Safety Convention and the  ISPS Code”386 
The Regulations 2004 have 10 parts which are: 
 Part one: Preliminary 
“This part details the objective of the Regulations 2004, their application and 
definitions. The Regulations 2004 define the meaning of unlawful interference with 
maritime transport which then clarifies the scope of application of the Regulation 
2004.”387 
 Part two: Maritime Security level and security direction 
This part provides for the application of the security levels, system notifications and 
security directions. The Regulations state that the default security level is maritime 
security 1, and places a duty on Director-General to declare, when it is appropriate for 
a higher level of security to be put in place, maritime security level 2 and level 3 as well 
as to direct maritime participants to comply with additional security measures when an 
unlawful interference is imminent or probable.”388  
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 Part three: Maritime security plans 
“This part requires certain maritime industry participants to have maritime security 
plans in force which must include security measures to be implements at security levels 
1, 2 and 3.”389 Additional detail on the form and content of the security plans is set out 
in Annexure 2 of the Regulations 2004. 
 Part four: Ship plans and ISSC 
“This part requires certain South African ships to security plans in force which include 
the activities to be embarked on in the different maritime security levels.  In addition, 
this part requires ships to have ISSCs that will be issued once the ISSC has been 
verified. Schedule 5 of part four of the Regulations 2004 contain the requirements for 
obtaining the certification.”390 
 Part five: Foreign regulated ships 
“This part requires certain foreign ships to provide pre- arrival information and their 
ISSCs to determine their compliance with the Regulations”391. Foreign ships also under 
an obligation under the Regulations to comply with the existing security levels.392 This 
Part further includes “compliance checks and control directions that foreign regulated 
ships are subject should they not comply with the Regulations 2004.”393  
 Part six: Powers of officials 
“This part deals with authorised officers, who may exercise powers for the purpose of 
checking compliance with these Regulations and/or preventing unlawful interference 
with maritime transport.”394 
 Part seven: Information Gathering 
“This part permits the Director-General to collect security compliance information form 
participants in the maritime industry, which enables the Director General to deal with, 
and resolve compliance concerns, before a security threat compromises the maritime 
industry.” 395 
 Part eight: Enforcement orders 
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“This Part deals enforcement orders that are issued in instances when a contraventions 
of the Regulations has occurred or it is suspected that such contravention of the 
Regulations has occurred. The two types of orders that may be issued are enforcement 
orders and ship enforcement orders. With the realisation that prosecutions are resource 
extensive, and while they may be the appropriate option in serious maritime security 
breaches, the Regulation’s allow the Director General of SAMSA the option to enforce 
compliance with the regulations by issuing orders instead of and in addition to 
prosecution.”396 
 Part nine: Miscellaneous 
“Thus Part deals with security alert systems. It requires certain South African regulated 
ships to be fitted with a ship security system complying with SOLAS regulations XI-
2/6.”397 
 Part ten: Administrative arrangements and fees 
“This Part pertains to “administrative matters including security agreements, 
exemptions, the exercise of the Director General’s powers and functions and fees.” 398 
The Regulations 2004, are an important legal instrument and South African Marine Agencies 
and shipping companies need to adhere to them. This will ensure the deterrence of perpetrators 
of cybercrimes and other forms of criminal activity, from unlawful interference with maritime 
transportation.  
3.3.2. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act399 
Electronic transactions have changed South Africa’s economic landscape. Businesses are 
gravitating to conducting their business online, because of the global economy that they can 
tap into. This has led to emerging cyber threats and a need for legal consequences to be 
promulgated. More so, because the “conventional legal frameworks governing the offline are 
proving to be inadequate in the online world”.400 The “Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act (ECT Act)” came into force on the 30th of August 2002, with an objective to 
“enable and facilitate electronic communications and transactions in the public interest”,401 
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ensure legal certainty402 and address security issues.403 The ECT Act works in conjunction with 
other relevant pieces of legislation and should be read and interpreted as such.404 The Act 
applies to any electronic transaction or data message.405 
Chapter 13 of ECT Act comprehensively deals with cyber-crimes and makes the first regulator 
provisions in South African jurisprudence. Section 88 of the ECT Act lists five statutory 
criminal offences, that a person or group of persons may be held liable for: 
(1) “Subject to the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No. 127 of 
1992), a person who intentionally accesses or intercepts any data without authority 
or permission to do so, is guilty of an offence;”406 
(2) “A person who intentionally and without authority to do so, interferes with data in 
a way which causes such data to be modified, destroyed or otherwise rendered 
ineffective, is guilty of an offence;”407 
(3) “A person who unlawfully produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, designs, 
adapts for use, distributes or possesses any device, including a computer program 
or a component, which is designed primarily to overcome security measures for the 
protection of data, or performs any of those acts with regard to a password, access 
code or any other similar kind of data with the intent to unlawfully utilise such item 
to contravene this section, is guilty of an offence;”408 
(4) “A person who utilises any device or computer program mentioned in subsection 
(3) in order to unlawfully overcome security measures designed to protect such data 
or access thereto, is guilty of an offence;”409 
(5) “A person who commits any act described in this section with the intent to interfere 
with access to an information system so as to constitute a denial, including a partial 
denial, of service to legitimate users is guilty of an offence.”410 
This list is wide enough to encompass the maritime cyber threats identified in chapter two of 
this dissertation. The ECT Act specifically provides that a court in the Republic will have 
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jurisdiction to try an offence, where “the offence was committed on board any ship or aircraft 
in the Republic or on a voyage or flight to or from the Republic at the time that the offence was 
committed”.411 Section 90 of the ECT Act, is very progressive in that it covers a wide range of 
instances where a South African court will have jurisdiction412 to prosecute an offence in terms 
of this act that was committed outside the country if: 
a) “Where the offence was committed in the Republic; 
b) Where part of the offence was committed in the Republic or the result of the offence 
has an effect in the Republic; 
c) Where the offence was committed by a South African citizen or a person with 
permanent residence in the Republic or a person carrying on business in the Republic; 
d) Or the offence was committed on board a ship or aircraft registered in the Republic or 
on a voyage or flight from the Republic at the time that the offence was committed.”413  
Particularly for maritime cyber security, as the nature of a cybercrime or cyber offence is that 
it can be initiated from anywhere in the world and still have devastating effects for maritime 
security, including critical infrastructure like ports. For a country like South Africa that is 
heavily reliant on proper functioning of its ports, with approximately 96 per cent of the 
country’s exports being conveyed by sea414, this piece of legislation, in particular  The ECT 
jurisdictional provision will go a long way in deterring maritime cyber attacks.?  
There are also other statutes that can be used in cases of cybercrimes in South Africa, including: 
3.3.3. Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-
Related Information(RICA)415  
With the aim of making South Africa a safer country, RICA requires cell phone users to register 
their details (full name, copy of identity document and address)416 with their perspective 
networks as of 1 August 2009.417 The objective of RICA is to assist law enforcement agencies 
identify individuals who use their phones for illegal activities.418 Section 2 of RICA provides 
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that “subject to this Act, no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept, or 
authorise or procure any person to intercept or attempt to intercept, at any place in the republic, 
any communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission”.419 RICA can be used to 
track down cyber criminals who use a cell phone to plan or execute their malicious cyber-
attacks in the maritime industry. RICA provides harsher penalties for persons found to have 
committed and offence under the Act, with fines not exceeding R 200 000.00 or imprisonment 
not exceeding ten years.420 Thus the criminal penalties in ECT appear to be insufficient to deter 
cyber perpetrators.421 
3.3.4. National Prosecuting Authority Act 422(NPA Act) 
In instances of insiders committing cybercrimes, the question of criminality often rests on the 
matter of unauthorised access. Mainly is establishing whether, where a person who had/has 
authorised access to a computer or a network of computers exceeded the scope of that authority. 
According to the NPA Act  ‘unauthorised access’ includes “access by a person who I authorised 
to use the computer but is not authorised to gain access to a certain program or to certain data 
held in such computer or is unauthorised at the time when the access is gained…”423 
3.3.5. Cybercrimes and Cyber Security Bill424 
 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was given a mandate to analyse 
the cyber laws of the republic, and determine whether, the current laws makes adequate 
provisions for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes, as well as whether the laws 
relating to cybercrimes could be consolidated to one single law.425 The analysis uncovered that 
South Africa’s cyber laws which is a hybrid legal system consisting of different articles of 
legislation and the common law (which was developed on a case by case basis) were not in line 
with those of the international community.426 It was further determined that our legal system 
with different laws only criminalising cybercrime as they relate to certain government 
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institutions.427 The Cybercrimes and Cyber Security Bill (herein after referred to as the 2017 
Bill) was first published on 28 August 2015428, and was introduced in Parliament on 21 
February 2017.429 According to the then “Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, the Honourable JH Jeffery, 
The development of the proposed legislation to enhance cyber security is a necessity. It is a 
milestone towards building safer communities as envisaged n the National Development 
Plan…the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development  has been tasked with the 
review and alignment of cybersecurity laws to ensure that these laws are aligned with the 
National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) and provide for an integrated cyber security 
legal framework for the Republic.”430 
 The 2017 Bill contains 13 chapters. Chapter one of the 2017 Bill contain definitions which are 
technical in their nature, and will assists in interpretation,431 as the nature of cybercrimes is so 
complex. Chapter two and three of the 2017 Bill establishes the different offences and creates 
new offences which will regulate illegal conduct in cyber space.432 The 2017 Bill further adapts 
“various other common law and statutory offences, which are currently used to prosecute 
conduct relating to cybercrime, to make the ore ‘usable’ for prosecution”.433 Section twelve 
criminalises involvement in cybercrimes by persons whether direct or indirectly.434 The 
jurisdiction clause found in section 23, Chapter 4, of the 2017 Bill, is very expansive, giving 
South African courts a number of ways to establish criminal jurisdiction.435 The 2017 bill, in 
chapter seven, proposes a 24/7 point of contact relating to cooperation in cybercrime matters, 
which would be a first for South Africa.436 Of particular importance to maritime trade is 
Chapter 12, which allows the national executive to enter into agreements with foreign states, 
in investigations and prosecutions of cybercrimes. This is essential because of the borderless 
nature of cybercrimes. 
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In July 2017 the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services issued an invitation 
for interested stakeholders and persons make written submission.437 Forty such stakeholders 
made written submissions438  including The South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC), the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CFCR) and Right 2 Know (R2K), whose 
submissions will be considered below.  
The SAHRC submitted that while it recognised the need for a legislative framework to address 
cyber security and cybercrimes in South Africa, there needed to be a delicate balance between 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy within the context of the Bill. It 
found issue with the definition clause of the Bill.439 The SAHRC noted with concern that a 
reading of the definition of the words “access” and “article” found in clause one of the Bill 
could potentially impact the right to privacy, which is protected in our Constitution.440 The 
SAHRC contended that the broad aspects of some of the Bill’s provisions may impact on 
investigative journalism, informants and whistle-blowers, including clauses 16 (‘malicious 
communications’) and 17 (‘data message which is harmful’) of the 2017 Bill.441 In addition the 
SAHRC stated that under the 2017 Bill terms needed to be more narrowly defined and the 
intention of the parties should play a factor when prosecuting crimes.442 
The Centre for Constitutional Rights delivered its submission on 10 August 2017. The CFCR 
recorded that there is a real need in South Africa for legislative measures to address the 
increasing cybercrimes and cyber security breaches. The CFCR welcomed the amendments 
made to the 2015 version of the Bill in particular he removal of “computer related espionage”; 
“personal information and financial offences”; “infringement of copyright” and “prohibition 
on dissemination of data messages which advocate , promote or incite hate , discrimination or 
violence”, but cited areas of concern in the 2017 Bill which it feels still infringe significantly 
on an individual’s constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of expression and  access to 
courts.443 The CFCR stated that it is important that the measures which the Bill proposed “do 
not stifle the free flow of communication out of fear of possible interception of 
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communication”.444 In this regard the CFCR further stated that terminology used in the Bill 
that relates to the prohibition of “malicious communication” has to be in line with the 
Constitutional provisions relating to limitation of the right to freedom of expression445 order to 
ensure “certainty and avoid confusion”.446   
Lastly the CFRC in paragraph 8.8 noted with concern the following: 
“Various provisions in the Bill are currently vaguely stipulated and of special concern to the 
CFCR is the extent to which this causes confusion with the regulatory measures provided for 
in RICA and unintentionally created a parallel system of surveillance. This needs to be clarified 
in order to be in line with the Rule of Law. This vagueness further creates potential abuse of 
the legal process.”447 
The CFCR therefore suggested the removal of clause 16 and 17, in their current format of the 
Bill. 448 The terms in clause 19 and 38 will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.449 
The Right2Know Campaign made its submission on the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 
on 10 August 2017. R2K noted with great concern the different cyber threats both at home and 
abroad which threaten internet freedom450 and the approves of the aim of the Bill to “improve 
the state’s capacity to fight actual cybercrime and out measures in place to upgrade security 
around all our cyber infrastructure to prevent further crime”451 In doing so however, R2K stated 
that any legislation that regulates cybercrime must clearly and narrowly be  so as to prevent 
possible misuse, state interference in its citizens data use and infringement on legitimate online 
activates.452 R2K submitted that it approved the changes to the 2015 Draft Bill that related to 
the removal of the ‘secrecy bill clauses’, which would have criminalised the accessing of 
classified information by whistle-blowers and journalists.453 Secondly it welcomed the removal 
of the copyright offenses created by the 2015 Cybercrimes draft Bill, which it identified to be 
“outrageously broad and inappropriate”.454 
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R2K identified the following four problems with the 2017 Bill: 
1. The Bill places a heavy burden on the State to define internet governance by making 
cyber security to fall under the domain of intelligence  
2. The Bill uses a top-down approach, to make internet users less prone to cyber-attacks, 
has the potential to make users less secure. 
3. The bill has not addressed many of the serious problems with RICA, which is currently 
South Africa’s main surveillance law. 
4. The offences created by the Bill relating to ‘malicious communication’ found in 
Chapter 3 of the Bill raise great concerns on infringements to the right to freedom of 
expression.   
R2K thus submit that “with the exception of the ‘revenge porn’ clauses the Malicious 
Communication sections of the Bill should be rejected. This is in line with the submissions 
made by the CFCR. According to R2K “there are already mechanisms to combat the ills of 
harmful and malicious commination.”455 It put forward that these existing mechanisms have 
been poorly implemented, and the solution is not to create new legal mechanisms to combat 
cyber security threats, but the solution is to “create a mot just and responsive justice system.”456 
In regards to the issues with freedom from surveillance R2K submitted that significant abuses 
have been noted by the states surveillance powers which it felt were enabled by the loopholes 
created by RICA.457   The UN Human Rights Committee make findings to the effect that South 
Africa’s surveillance laws are not in line with international human rights laws.458 Further to 
this, the AmaBhungane Centre or Investigative Journalism, has challenged the constitutionally 
of some RICA provision.459   R2K stated that Section 38 of the Bill seeks to change some 
provisions of RICA. R2K thus concluded that “the lack of clarity, even form within state 
institutions and policy makers, about how the state’s surveillance polices work, as made it 
extremely difficult to reach consensus on what Section 38 means.460 
Finally, as regards the Cybersecurity part of the Bill, R2K submitted that any cybersecurity 
legal framework need to safeguard against state invasion of privacy and over-reach by the state 
security structures. It contended that it is inappropriate to give the primary stewardship over 
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cybersecurity to state security structures because this could lead to lack of transparency and 
abuse.461 The appropriate stewardship should lie with the civil department, in this case the 
Ministry of Communications. Therefore, Chapters 10 and 11 should be redrafted in its 
entirety.462  
The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services announced that a revised version of the Bill 
was to be laid before Parliament in 2017, however it failed to publish the comments of an 
analysis of their content which has received criticism.463 In October 2018 the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development a notably different version of the Bill to the Portfolio 
Committee for Justice and Correctional Services. The biggest changed being the removal of 
part two of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 2017 which primarily related to 
cybersecurity.464 The removal of the Cybersecurity part of the Bill has thus necessitated the 
renaming of the Bill to the Cybercrimes Bill.465 This change came after an extensive public 
participation process where serious concerns regarding the states possible encroachment on the 
Right to freedom of expression, which is provided for in the Constitution, and the freedom of 
internet.466 It was submitted that the approach by the South African legislature did not strike 
the right balance between the rights of an individual rights and freedoms and the interest pf the 
State in securing cyberspace and protecting the interest of the country, businesses and 
individuals.467  Other changes to the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill include: 
 The definition of ‘unlawful’ in the cybercrimes Bill has been more narrowly defined 
and has been aligned with the provisions of Protection of Personal Information, 2013.468 
 The scope of the provisions relating to ‘malicious communications’ found in Part II of 
the Bill is now limited to data, messages of an intimate image without consent which 
threaten and individual to bodily harm and violence.469 
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 The Cybercrimes Bill has removed clauses that deal with critical infrastructure.470 
Given the complex nature of cybercrimes, and the maritime cyber security threat environment, 
the cybercrimes Bill is a step in the right direction for South Africa. It will also prove to be an 
important piece of legislation in South Africa once it is assented to by the president of the 
Republic, in its final version. The Cybercrimes Bill has closed the gaps identified in the ECT 
Act and RICA. The new offences which were created by the Bill, which have been listed above, 
and which were difficult to prosecute under RICA and ECT, are now provided for in the 
Cybercrimes Bill. This is so, because the jurisdiction provisions that are provided for in the 
Bill are expensive. Further, the penalty provisions created by the bill, which include a 
maximum penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment will mean that cybercrime perpetrators are 
deterred from committing cyber transgression. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1. Conclusion 
The maritime sector was shown to be susceptible to maritime cyber threats. Frew, BIMCO’s 
Secretary General and CEO stated that “ignorance is no longer an option, as we are all rapidly 
realising”.471 The aim of this dissertation was to survey the extent of the legislative framework 
governing maritime cyber security and provide a road map on the development of the legal 
regime governing maritime cyber security both internationally and domestically, and then 
critically evaluate the implementation and enforceability of the legal regime to handle cyber 
security threats in the maritime industry. This dissertation has shown that the maritime sector 
has unique factors, including dynamic changes in maritime technology, social, economic and 
environmental elements that provide significant challenges to national infrastructure, and 
domestic and international security.472  
It has been shown in chapter two of the dissertation that cyber transgressions are complex and 
cybercrimes know no border. Cyber criminals and victims of cybercrimes do not have to have 
had any physical encounter, but the unlawful act may have a “direct and immediate effect to 
the victim”.473  It is evident from the discussion on cyber threats to South Africa and 
international shipping companies, and the cost repercussions thereof, that cyber security is a 
priority for international maritime security and national security as South Africa is port state 
that relies on the efficient and effective functioning of all its ports. The rapid rate with which 
technological advancements and with which cyber criminal’s conduct their transgressions has 
created a gap that needs to be regulated comprehensively. The study was of great importance 
as marine transportation is a critical international industry as provided for in chapter one. The 
prevalence of cyber security threats was shown to be increasing. The scale of the maritime 
cyber security incidents that were discussed in chapter two have shown that the world and more 
importantly shipping companies and port states like South Africa, need to be better equipped 
legally to deal with the above discussed maritime cyber vulnerabilities and threats. A stating 
point in addressing the issue of maritime cyber security, with a focus on a global approach to 
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the issue, may be in looking at the regulation of piracy on the high seas as it is similar to 
maritime cybercrimes as they too are borderless in nature.474 
The current international, regional and domestic legal framework has been responsive rather 
than taking a more pre-emptive robust approach to creation of legislation.  The SUA, ISPS 
Code and even the Tallinn Manual, are all examples of reactionary legal instruments. A global 
approach to addressing the threats, discussed in chapter two above, faced by the maritime 
industry is needed, as the nature of cybercrimes is transnational and borderless. 
 The legal framework, both international and domestic, governing maritime cyber security in 
South Africa was discussed in Chapter three of this dissertation. From the discussion in chapter 
three above, it has been established that a legal framework regulating maritime cyber security 
does exist internationally, however it is mostly on a state-by- state basis or perceived to be 
regionally focused.475 The Budapest Convention is the first international treaty that has 
attempted to tackle this mammoth problem of cybersecurity vulnerabilities,476 which is a step 
in the right direction and commendable. However international cooperation is needed in order 
to comply with International Conventions such as the ECC.477 While the ECC aims at 
international cooperation in combating cybercrimes, no specific provisions are contacted in the 
convention for cooperation in securing these networks, which therefore makes implementation 
in practice difficult.478 The buy-in from port states and the international community as a whole 
has proven to be very low. The current conventions in place that specifically regulate maritime 
cyber security, such as the ECCC, have not received the number of signatures needed to be a 
serious deterrence to cyber criminals. Further the countries that are signatories to the ECCC 
have not acceded to the Convention or ratified the convention. These factors make regulating 
the cyber domain of the maritime industry very difficult and prosecution of cyber offences, 
even more difficult.  
The AU Convention on Cyber Security has gone a long way in prioritising the need for African 
states to address cyber security concerns. However there are great concerns as to whether the 
Convention had tackled the issues that lead to its delay in January 2014. These concerns include 
criticism on the over the content-related offences, as it was felt that it “imposed dangerously 
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broad limitations of free speech”.479 It should be remembered that South Africa has not signed 
the AU Convention on Cyber Security, the broad nature of the AU Convention on Cyber 
Security does not explicitly establish a comprehensive legal framework that South Africa can 
adopt into their legal framework. It is submitted that for a country like South Africa that already 
has existing laws that regulate cybercrimes and that has its own draft Bill that is being 
considered, the AU Convention on Cyber Security is too cumbersome480 and would require the 
South African legislature to reconcile its domestic laws with that of the Convention. According 
to Cassim “African countries have been criticised for dealing inadequately with cybercrimes, 
as their law enforcement agencies are inadequately equipped in terms of personnel, intelligence 
and infrastructure”.481  
In South Africa, a legal framework exists that partially regulates cyber security, though it is not 
specific to maritime cyber security. Maritime cyber transgressions can be read into the Acts 
discussed in Chapter 3.2 above as the wording of the Acts are broad enough to encompass 
maritime cyber security transgressions. The domestic regulatory provisions in South Africa are 
inadequate for these jurisdictional problems.  The problem in South Africa is exacerbated by 
the fact that an unknown number of cybercrimes are undetected as they are not reported to 
relevant structures.482 This detection problem is compounded by the fact that “African countries 
have long and permeable Borders”483  Prosecution of cybercrimes is therefore not possible 
without adequate laws in place that procedurally and substantively criminalise cyber 
transgressions. The introduction of the Cybercrimes Bill will hopefully go a long way in 
eradicating these challenges. The bill seeks to introduce structure, as discussed in chapter three, 
that will be mandated to monitor cybercrimes, and take measures in deterring cybercrimes in 
the country. Political-will plays a major role in this regard, as more pressure needs to be placed 
on the legislature by interested industry stakeholders, and civil society, to enact laws that will 
protect the South African population and critical infrastructure such as ports and ships against 
cyber threats, as well as to ensure the current Cybercrimes Bill is assented to by the President 
of the Republic. There is also a great need to have the laws relating to cyber offences in South 
Africa to be consolidated in to one Act and harmonised. Currently one has to look at multiple 
pieces of legislation and interpret words broadly in order to deal with a cyber-attack, or to 
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prosecute cyber offences. It is submitted that the South African legislature seeking to regulate 
the maritime cyber security legal environment, should resist the overregulated the legal 
paradigm and make sure that all new legislation is in line with the constitution.  
 
4.2. Recommendations: 
In order for South Africa to address the challenges in providing a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for governing maritime cyber security, some amendments to the current legislative 
landscape are necessary. Currently there is no international instrument that comprehensively 
regulates maritime cyber security.  The recommendations based on the findings of the study 
are as follows. 
  A holistic and pre-emptive approach: 
South African law makers, must avoid a reactionary approach to legislation creation, firstly 
because this reactionary approach could lead to legislation that does not fully address the issue 
of maritime cyber security threats or encroaches on existed constitutional provisions such as 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Secondly, a reactionary approaches 
requires for a catastrophic event to have already have happened. This could have devastating 
economic consequence to the economy of the country. 
 Comprehensive statute to address cyber security explicitly providing for maritime 
cybercrimes and security 
As has been found no single statute enforce exists in South Africa to deal with cyber threats. 
The South Africa Legislature thus has to assent to the Cybercrimes Bill. The current version of 
the Bill saw drastic improvements to the cybercrimes section and took into consideration the 
submissions made by the different stakeholders that were discussed in Chapter 3 above. This 
was done by taking a narrow approach to definitions provided in section and addressing the 
concerns regarding freedom of expression. While the Bill still needs to be considered by the 
National Assembly484 and awaiting comments from the public this appears to be a great stride 
for South Africa to deter and ensure a deterrence against cyber attacks.  
Second, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development needs to redraft or create a 
Bill that encompasses the cybersecurity section that was removed from the Cybercrimes Bill 
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with a great sense of urgency. This must be done while balance the need to enact progressive 
cyber legislation and ensuring that the State does not infringe on the existing rights of its 
people. This will also assist companies like those in the maritime shipping industry to become 
cyber secure, and implement cyber security strategies within their companies. 
 Amendments to existing domestic instruments: 
In the alternative to the recommendation provided above, relating to the enactment of a 
comprehensive legal instrument that explicitly deals with the regulation of cyber security and 
in effect maritime cyber security, the following recommendations are made: 
o Amendments to chapter thirteen of the ECT Act will need to be made to narrowly and 
more tightly define cyber transgression/offences. 
o  Amendments to the ECT Act will need to be made to provide for stricter punishments 
for cyber transgression/offences which lead to a stronger deterrence of cybercrime. The 
current penalties in section 89 of ECT Act is not sufficient to deter cybercrime 
perpetrators, this more so when compared to the potential financial ramifications of a 
cyber-attack to, for example, to big shipping companies like Maersk or MSC.  
o Amendments to the ECT Act will need to be made to provide clarity on the effect of 
Section 15 of the ECT Act on the hearsay rule and authenticity rule,485 which is binding 
in our legal system. 
 
 South Africa should ratify the ECCC  
Not only does the ECCC makes mandatory provisions for its signatories to enact  robust 
procedural provision that regulate matters to jurisdiction, extradition and mutual assistance, it 
further provides national legislatures to criminalise a wide range of narrowly defined486 
cybercrimes that are provided for in chapter above. It is therefore important for South Africa 
to ratify this important legal convention so as to deter cyber criminal’s form targeting South 
Africa.487  
 Maritime Industry guidelines 
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With regards to Marine shipping companies and Maritime Industry guidelines the following 
recommendations are made: 
o Shipping companies and operators need to develop, implement and maintain the 
provisions and standards provided in the BIMCO Guidelines that relating to security of 
cyber systems on board a ship. 
o Shipping operators and port officials to ensure that they have an approved safety 
management system as mandated by the ISM Code. 
o Shipping operators and port officials need to take robust and comprehensive steps that 
ensure that their cyber risk management processes are in line with the ISM Code and 
ISPS Code provisions that deal with cyber security discussed in chapter three above.488 
o Ship Security Plans and Safety Management Manuals on board ships should include 
cybersecurity controls, procedures and policies that are in line with the Regulations 
2004, and other best practice guidelines and codes.  
Lastly it is recommended that both domestic and international legislatures develop maritime 
cyber security regulatory framework that is based on international cooperation to ensure for a 
more secure maritime industry.  
Considering the risk of financial loss and the fact that shipping companies are prone to face 
heavy fines or legal issues arising from cyber threats, it is equally important for shipping 
companies to lobby for rapid and robust change in the domestic and international legal 
framework governing cyber security incidents. 
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